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No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Potential Lender
Liability for Paycheck Protection Program Lenders
I. INTRODUCTION
Following a decade of economic growth,1 the United States is in
the midst of yet another financial crisis.2 But this financial crisis is far
different from the previous ones.3 Indeed, it is the result of a once-in-acentury pandemic.4 This pandemic, caused by the rapid spread of
COVID-19,5 has wreaked havoc on the global economy and uprooted the
lives of billions of people.6

1. See Chart Book: Tracking the Post-Great Recession Economy, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/chart-booktracking-the-post-great-recession-economy [https://perma.cc/W3ZK-MLMF] (tracking
United States economic growth between 2009 and early 2020).
2. See id. (analyzing the early effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the U.S. economy).
3. See Louise Sheiner, How Does the Coronavirus Pandemic Compare to the Great
Recession, and What Should Fiscal Policy Do Now?, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 12, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/03/12/how-does-the-coronavirus-pandemiccompare-to-the-great-recession-and-what-should-fiscal-policy-do-now/
[https://perma.cc/VZ48-HJKE] (contrasting the 2020 Financial Crisis from the 2008 Financial
Crisis”).
4. See Bill Gates, Responding to Covid-19—A Once-in-a-Century Pandemic?, NEW ENG.
J. MED. (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/nejmp2003762
[https://perma.cc/72G7-NM93] (describing the arguments of global health experts who
believed “that another pandemic whose speed and severity rivaled those of the 1918 influenza
epidemic was a matter not of if but of when”).
5. Kathryn Reid, What is the Coronavirus? Facts, Symptoms, and How to Help, WORLD
VISION (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.worldvision.org/disaster-relief-news-stories/what-iscoronavirus-facts [https://perma.cc/FWZ7-XSCR].
6. See Alexander Chudik, Economic Consequences of Covid-19: A Counterfactual MultiCountry Analysis, VoxEU (Oct. 2020), https://voxeu.org/article/economic-consequencescovid-19-multi-country-analysis [https://perma.cc/2B3W-5SQN] (concluding that COVID19 has caused a global recession that will be very long lasting).
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COVID-19 has been particularly harmful for the U.S. economy.7
As the virus began to spread rapidly around the United States,8 states
responded by implementing stay-at-home orders9 to curb its spread.10
These stay-at-home orders affected the economy more sharply in three
months of the pandemic than in the two years of the 2008 Financial
Crisis.11 While various parts of the economy were impacted differently,12
one thing was clear—Americans needed help quickly.13
Therefore, Congress passed new legislation to help Americans
during this financial crisis.14 Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”)15 two weeks after
7. See generally Robert Fairle, The Impact of Covid-19 on Small Business Owners:
Evidence of Early Stage Losses from the April 2020 Current Population Survey, 1–2 (Stanford
Inst. for Econ. Policy and Research, Working Paper No. 20-022, 2020),
https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/20-022.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WR4H-R375] (providing an early account of the effects of COVID-19 on
the United States).
8. See Anne Schuchat, Public Health Response to the Initiation and Spread of Pandemic
COVID-19 in the United States, February 24–April 21, 2020, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 551, 551 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6918e2H.pdf [https://perma.cc/PX26-C5FQ] (analyzing the spread of COVID-19 from Wuhan,
China to the rest of the world, focusing on the rapid spread of the virus in the United States).
9. See, e.g., N.C. Exec. Order No. 121 (Mar. 27, 2020) (declaring that “all individuals
currently in the State of North Carolina are ordered to stay at home”); Va. Exec. Order No.
53 (Mar. 30, 2020) (declaring the closure of most businesses and public gatherings).
10. See Amanda Moreland, Timing of State and Territorial COVID-19 Stay-at-Home
Orders and Changes in Population Movement — United States, March 1–May 31, 2020,
MORBIDITY
AND
MORTALITY
WEEKLY
REP.
1198–1202
(2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6935a2-H.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJB3YQWE] (describing the population movement across the United States before and after states
put stay-at-home orders into effect).
11. Rakesh Kochhar, Unemployment Rose Higher in Three Months of COVID-19 Than it
did in Two Years of the Great Recession, PEW RES. CTR. (June 11, 2020)
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/06/11/unemployment-rose-higher-in-threemonths-of-covid-19-than-it-did-in-two-years-of-the-great-recession/ [https://perma.cc/FFF8Q2JV].
12. Mark Muro, The Places a COVID-19 Recession Will Likely Hit Hardest, BROOKINGS
INST. (March 17, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2020/03/17/the-placesa-covid-19-recession-will-likely-hit-hardest/ [https://perma.cc/8UUE-HYDE].
13. See Fairle, supra note 7 (detailing the plummeting of small businesses in the United
States following the stay-at-home orders implemented in response to COVID-19).
14. See Nick Schwellenbach, The First 100 Days of the U.S. Government’s COVID-19
Response, POGO.ORG (May 6, 2020), https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2020/05/the-first-100days-of-the-u-s-governments-covid-19-response/ [https://perma.cc/CEZ4-HGN7] (providing
a detailed timeline of the first 100 days of the U.S. government’s response to the COVID-19
pandemic).
15. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) § 1102, 15
U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36) (West 2021).
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former President Donald Trump declared COVID-19 a national
emergency.16 Included among the many provisions of the CARES Act
was an emergency loan program known as the Paycheck Protection
Program (“PPP”).17 The PPP was designed to help businesses that were
affected the most by the pandemic.18 The CARES Act allocated the most
money for an emergency relief program in U.S. history—over $2 trillion
toward its emergency relief efforts, 19 with initially $659 billion allocated
toward the PPP.20 Lenders were in charge of processing PPP loan
applications and servicing the loans, and ultimately many lenders across
the country began to participate. 21 After administering loans for several
months, the second round of the PPP concluded on August 8, 2020.22
Congress then added a third round of PPP funding under the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (“Relief Act”).23 This Act went

16. See Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 13, 2020) (“NOW,
THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States, by the authority
vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including
sections 201 and 301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) and consistent
with section 1135 of the Social Security Act (SSA), as amended (42 U.S.C. 1320b-5), do
hereby find and proclaim that the COVID-19 outbreak in the United States constitutes a
national emergency, beginning March 1, 2020.”).
17. CARES Act § 1102, § 636(a)(36).
18. See Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85
Fed. Reg. 20811, 20811–12 (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/202004/PPP%20Interim%20Final%20Rule_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/X458-EPXB] (explaining the
general purpose of the Paycheck Protection Program).
19. Erica Werner, Trump Signs $2 Trillion Coronavirus Bill Into Law as Companies and
Households Brace for More Economic Pain, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/03/27/congress-coronavirus-house-vote/
[https://perma.cc/5T9V-UWKR].
20. The CARES Act Provides Assistance to Small Businesses, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/cares/assistance-for-small-businesses (last visited
September 12, 2020) [https://perma.cc/X4PP-EZH4].
21. See SMALL BUS. ADMIN., LENDERS PARTICIPATING IN PPP BY STATE (Apr. 23, 2020),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/202004/Lenders%20participating%20in%20PPP%20by%20State_As%20of%2004%2023%2020
.pdf [https://perma.cc/CA6T-JLPN] (listing by state hundreds of lenders participating in the
PPP).
22. Andy Medici, SBA’s Paycheck Protection Program Set to Expire Aug. 8, WASH. BUS.
J. (Aug. 6, 2020, 3:48 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/washington/news/2020/08/06/sbappp-loan-expire-august-deadline.html [https://perma.cc/ZGA5-FEER].
23. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (“Relief Act”), Pub. L. No. 116–260, 134
Stat. 1182, 1993 (2020) (Westlaw through slip copy of legislation, providing estimated statute
at large page numbers because the Statute at Large for this Act has not been released at the
time of this Note’s publication).
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into effect on December 27, 202024 and authorizes lenders to administer
PPP loans until March 31, 2021.25 Small businesses that did not receive
a PPP loan the first time are allowed to apply under this new legislation.26
The Act also created Second Draw Loans for businesses that received an
initial PPP loan but need additional funding.27
Based on these statutory authorities, the PPP has two competing
methods for providing relief to businesses.28 On one hand, Congress
wishes to process PPP loan applications on a first come, first served
basis.29 On the other hand, Congress wishes to administer the PPP loans
as fast as possible without an order for processing loan applications. 30
Satisfying the first goal of processing the PPP loans on a first
come, first served basis has been difficult for participating lenders.31 The
difficulty arises because many of the businesses that apply first to PPP
lenders are new customers, and banks need to vet new customers who
apply for PPP loans.32 Vetting new customers involves higher costs
24. Seung Min Kim, Trump Signs Stimulus and Government Spending Bill into Law,
Averting
Shutdown,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
27,
2020,
9:34
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/12/27/trump-stimulus-shutdown-congress/
[https://perma.cc/GFM7-4RWE].
25. See Relief Act, 134 Stat. at 2019 (amending the CARES Act by substituting March 31,
2021 for August 8, 2020 as the deadline for providing PPP loans).
26. See id. (providing sections 301 to 311 that outline the conditions for initial and Second
Draw PPP loans).
27. See id. (detailing section 311 that creates the PPP Second Draw Loans).
28. See generally Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection
Program,
85
Fed.
Reg.
20811,
20811
(Apr.
15,
2020),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/PPP%20Interim%20Final%20Rule_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X458-EPXB] (providing a general overview of the Paycheck Protection
Program).
29. See id. at 20813 (answering yes to the frequently asked question that the PPP is served
on a first-come, first-served basis).
30. See Press Release from Maxine Waters, Waters Releases Extended Statement for the
Record
on
the
CARES
Act
(Mar.
31,
2020),
https://financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=406468
[https://perma.cc/PRF4-CRK9] (describing the involvement of the private sector for PPP
lending to administer PPP loans as fast as possible).
31. See The Quandary for Banks and Lenders Created by the PPP, MORRIS, MANNING, &
MARTIN, LLP (May 18, 2020), https://www.mmmlaw.com/media/the-quandary-for-banksand-lenders-created-by-the-ppp/ [https://perma.cc/HM97-TF7E] (explaining the litigation
that resulted from the alleged failure of PPP lenders to process PPP loans on a first come, first
served basis).
32. Under the third round of PPP, however, the Relief Act has made the vetting process
easier for PPP loans. See Relief Act, 134 Stat. at 1996–97 (providing section 305, which
allows PPP lenders to rely on the certification of PPP applicants as long as certain statutory
requirements are satisfied).
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compared to preexisting customers who have already been vetted for
previous loans.33 Therefore, lenders may avoid vetting costs by
processing the applications of preexisting customers first. 34 Avoiding
vetting costs satisfies the PPP’s second goal of administering PPP loans
as fast as possible. Given the competing goals of the PPP, lenders have
acted consistently with the second PPP goal but not the first.
Failing to act consistently with the PPP’s first goal has caused the
public to believe that PPP lenders have acted contrary to Congressional
intent.35 More specifically, there are two groups that feel wronged by
PPP lenders.36 The first group consists of PPP applicants whose loan
applications were denied. 37 The denied applicants believe that they were
wronged by the PPP lenders because lenders appeared to prioritize
lending to preexisting customers although new customers had applied
first.38 The second group consists of third party companies (“agents”)
that helped successful applicants receive PPP loans but were not paid
compensation by PPP lenders.39 These agents argue that lenders owe
33. See Amara Omeokwe & Ryan Tracy, Treasury Department Encouraged Banks to
Prioritize Existing Customers for PPP Loans, House Panel Says, Wall St. J. (Oct. 16, 2020,
5:52
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/treasury-department-encouraged-banks-toprioritize-existing-customers-for-ppp-loans-democratic-report-says-11602861336
[https://perma.cc/P7LV-NPRB] (explaining that PPP lenders prioritized preexisting
customers at first because the lenders already had the information of those customers, which
made administering PPP loans easier).
34. C.f. id. (providing the conclusion of a House oversight committee which stated that the
Department of Treasury encouraged PPP lenders to process the PPP loan applications for
preexisting customers first because doing so would save costs and allow the program to run
quicker).
35. See, e.g., Complaint for Plaintiff at 29-31, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn, LLC v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.D. Ill. (2020) (No. 1:20-cv-02523) (“As a result of Defendants’
actions, Sha-Poppin is now at a severe risk of having to lay off its employees and shutter its
business—the very result Congress sought to avoid in creating a first-come, first-served loan
program to be deployed by SBA banking partners with all deliberate speed. At minimum,
Sha-Poppin lost out on $19,000 in PPP loan funds it would have otherwise received, but for
Defendants’ misconduct.”).
36. See Robert Carothers & Graham Ryan, Litigation and Regulatory Risks to Banks from
Paycheck
Protection
Program,
NAT’L
L.
REV.
(May
21,
2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/litigation-and-regulatory-risks-to-banks-paycheckprotection-program [https://perma.cc/AZ37-RPVD] (outlining the different types of litigation
risks affecting PPP lenders).
37. See id. (providing one example of a litigation risk affecting PPP lenders as lawsuits
brought by denied PPP applicants who believe that lenders prioritized preexisting, larger
customers).
38. See id. (listing multiple reasons for why denied applicants feel wronged by PPP
lenders).
39. Id.
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them compensation40 because Small Business Administration (“SBA”)
regulations expressly impose this requirement.41
Both groups believed that their only recourse was through the
courts.42 As such, both groups have brought class action lawsuits against
PPP lenders.43 The denied applicants and agents initially brought
unsuccessful claims under the theory that some PPP lenders violated the
CARES Act.44 Courts did not accept this argument because they held
that there is no private right of action under the CARES Act.45 In other
words, denied applicants and agents cannot sue lenders even if the lenders
are proven to have violated the CARES Act.46 Because neither group
may sue under this legislation, they turned to theories of recovery under
common law.47 More specifically, both groups have brought claims
grounded in common law theories in tort and contract law.48 For these
reasons, banks are potentially exposed to lender liability. 49
Understanding the risk of lender liability is important for PPP
lenders going forward. If lenders are found liable at common law, courts

40. Id.
41. See Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85

Fed. Reg. 20811, 20816 (Apr. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/PPP%20Interim%20Final%20Rule_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X458-EPXB] (“Agent fees will be paid by the lender out of the fees the
lender receives from SBA . . . One (1) percent for loans of not more than $350,000; 0.50
percent for loans of more than $350,000 and less than $2 million; and 0.25 percent for loans
of at least $2 million.”).
42. See, e.g., Complaint for Plaintiff at 29-31, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn, LLC v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.D. Ill. (2020) (No. 1:20-cv-02523) (lawsuit by denied applicants).
43. See, e.g., Complaint for Plaintiff at 7, Panda Group, PC v. Bank of America, C.D. Utah
(2020) (No. 4:20-cv-00045-DN) (providing an example of a class action complaint brought
by a group of agents).
44. See, e.g., Profiles, Inc. v. Bank of America Corp., 453 F. Supp. 3d 742, 751 (D. Md.
Apr. 13, 2020) (dismissing claim that PPP lenders violated the CARES Act because Congress
did not intend a private right of action).
45. Id.
46. See Caroline Bermeo, Implied Private Rights of Action: Definition, and Factors to
Determine Whether a Private Action Will Be Implied From a Federal Statute, 49 LOYOLA U.
CHI. L.J. 117, 120 (2017) (defining private right of action as when a private plaintiff can bring
an action directly under a federal statute).
47. See Robert Travisano, No Quarter for PPP Lenders, NAT’L L. REV. (June 8, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/no-quarter-ppp-lenders
[https://perma.cc/NXM5362P] (listing negligence, common law fraud, and unjust enrichment as examples of theories
of recovery under common law that plaintiffs are bringing against PPP lenders).
48. Id.
49. See id. (listing the ongoing lawsuits against PPP lenders stemming from common law
violations).
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will require them to pay large amounts in damages to borrowers, 50
contributing to the decreased revenue which lenders already expect from
servicing PPP loans.51 Lenders may then become discouraged from
participating in future government loan programs. 52 Accordingly,
understanding the current risk of lender liability helps define the
reasonable standard of conduct for PPP lenders, providing confidence to
lenders wishing to participate in future government loan programs.
Proceeding in five parts, this Note examines the potential lender
liability for banks participating in the PPP and argues that banks
ultimately face a low likelihood of liability. Part II provides a brief
overview of the PPP and the role of banks within that program.53 Part III
explains the liability that results from servicing PPP loans. 54 Part IV
assesses the likelihood of lender liability for lenders participating in the
PPP.55 Finally, Part V reflects on the participation of lenders in the PPP
and concludes that limited lender liability has helped contribute to the
PPP’s general success. 56
II. THE PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM
When COVID-19 was first discovered on December 31, 2019,
most of the world did not realize how their lives would be uprooted in the
following year. 57 On January 30, 2020, the World Health Organization
(“WHO”) declared that COVID-19 was a public health emergency of
50. See, e.g., Jacques v. First Nat’l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 545, 515 A2d. 756, 765 (Md. Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that lenders may be liable at common law and therefore owe both
contract and tort damages, including punitive damages, for failure to process loan applications
with due care).
51. See Stacey Cowley, Despite Billions in Fees, Banks Predict Meager Profits on P.P.P.
Loans, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/01/business/ppp-loansbank-profits.html [https://perma.cc/R2PD-SEK3] (describing how banks are reporting the
costs to service PPP loans is expected to wipe out the profits earned from fees paid by the
SBA and interest rate).
52. See Jeanna Smialek, Big Banks Aren’t Embracing Fed’s Main Street Lending Program,
N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/business/economy/federalreserves-lending-coron.html [https://perma.cc/XFV7-X3CT] (concluding that big banks are
unlikely to participate in other government loan programs like the Main Street Lending
Program because the PPP caused lenders to incur heavy costs from ongoing litigation and
therefore left PPP lenders “a sour taste”).
53. See infra Part II.
54. See infra Part III.
55. See infra Part IV.
56. See infra Part V.
57. Reid, supra note 5.
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international concern.58 By March 11, 2020, the WHO declared a
pandemic.59
The pandemic quickly devastated the U.S. economy.60 In fact,
the pandemic is continuing to have a disproportionate impact on small
business owners.61 To mitigate the harmful effects of this pandemic, the
federal government enacted the PPP as part of the CARES Act.62
Implementing this type of program required a vast government power that
the federal government has developed over the course of U.S. history.63
A.

Government Power During Financial Crises

The federal government has vast power over the U.S. economy
during economic downturns.64 Throughout U.S. history, the federal
government has exercised its power to intervene in financial crises. 65
There are three historical periods that are most significant in defining the
scope of government power to implement the PPP: The Panic of 1907,
the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the Great Recession of 2008.66

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Fairle, supra note 7.
61. See id. (explaining how COVID-19’s impact on American small business owners is

“likely to be severe”).
62. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) § 1102, 15
U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36) (West 2021).
63. See generally Robert Higgs, The Growth of Government in the United States, FOUND.
FOR ECON. EDUC. (Aug. 1, 1990), https://fee.org/articles/the-growth-of-government-in-theunited-states/ [https://perma.cc/MLA2-YMQ3] (describing the increase of U.S. government
intervention in the economy over U.S. history).
64. See generally id. (describing the increase of U.S. government intervention in the
economy over U.S. history).
65. See Steve Lohr, Intervention Is Bold, But Has a Basis in History, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13,
2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/14/business/economy/14nationalize.html
[https://perma.cc/RF9W-JRFA] (explaining that the U.S. federal government’s power to
intervene during the 2008 Financial Crisis was rooted in authority that the federal government
exercised throughout US history).
66. See US DEP’T OF STATE, THE ROLE OF GOV’T IN THE ECON.
https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/oecon/chap6.htm [https://perma.cc/3TF3-6ESH] (last visited
October 6, 2020) (highlighting that the most significant government interventions in the
economy were the creation of the Federal Reserve Bank, New Deal, and federal deposit
insurance fund, which were intended to address future financial crises and the unique aspects
of banking in the economy); see also Robert K. Rasmussen, Governmental Intervention in an
Economic Crisis, 19 U. OF PA. J. OF BUS. LAW, 7, 13–22 (2016)
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1529&context=jbl
[https://perma.cc/6KX7-P6TD] (analyzing federal government intervention during the Great
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Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act (“FRA”) 67 after the
Panic of 1907 to create a federal oversight system that continues to this
today.68 The FRA implemented this system of federal oversight through
an agency called the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (“FRB”). 69
The FRA delegated power to the FRB to run regional federal reserve
banks, and those banks serve as the lender of last resort in the economy.70
Ultimately the federal reserve banks act as lenders for banks through the
discount window.71
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, government
intervention greatly expanded the scope of government power, creating
programs that remain in effect today.72 One such program is the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). 73 The FDIC protects a
customer’s bank deposit up to $250,000 in the event of a bank failure. 74
By expanding the federal power to protect a customer’s deposits from
risky bank activities, a strong federal safety net was created in the
financial system.75

Recession of 2008 and the legal impact this crisis has on government intervention in future
financial crises).
67. C,f, Federal Reserve Act § 1, 12 U.S.C. § 226 (2018) (codifying the Federal Reserve
Act).
68. FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, BORN OF A PANIC: FORMING THE FED SYSTEM
(1988),
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/1988/born-of-a-panic-forming-the-fedsystem [https://perma.cc/UN7E-QMQE].
69. See Federal Reserve Act § 10, 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2018) (describing the creation and
structure of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
70. FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 68.
71. See Federal Reserve Act § 13, 12 U.S.C. § 347a (2018) (explaining the conditions that
member banks must comply with to receive loans through the discount window of the Federal
Reserve Banks).
72. See generally Hugh Rockoff, By Way of Analogy: The Expansion of the Federal
Government in the 1930s, U. OF CHI. PRESS, 125, 125 (1998) (describing how the New Deal
during the Great Depression greatly expanded the federal government’s authority).
73. See generally HIST. OF THE FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/about/history/
[https://perma.cc/UXX5-H5JX] (offering transcripts and recordings from the 1930s when the
FDIC was created).
74. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) (2018) (changing the “standard maximum deposit
insurance amount” from $100,000 to $250,000, making permanent a change the FDIC
exercised using its emergency powers during the 2008 Financial Crisis).
75. See ABOUT FDIC: WHAT WE DO, https://www.fdic.gov/about/what-we-do/index.html
(May 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6YJQ-9JTB] (“The mission of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is to maintain stability and public confidence in the nation's
financial system. In support of this goal, the FDIC: [i]nsures deposits, [e]xamines and
supervises financial institutions for safety and soundness and consumer protection, [w]orks
to make large and complex financial institutions resolvable, and [m]anages receiverships.”).
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The FRB and FDIC exercised broad emergency powers that were
later limited through Congressional action.76 During the Great Recession
of 2008, the FRB helped individual financial institutions. The FDIC
exercised its authority under the systemic risk exception to implement
broad-based eligibility programs to protect uninsured depositors and
other bank creditors.77 Both the FRB and FDIC’s actions were widely
criticized. 78 When the FRB chose to bail out Bear Sterns and American
International Group (“AIG”), but not Lehman Brothers, the FRB was
criticized because it seemed to choose the winners and losers in the
economy.79 The FDIC’s exercise of the systemic risk exception was
widely criticized as inconsistent with the FDIC’s statutory authority,
which critics read to authorize the FDIC to help only individual financial
institutions.80 In response to this public criticism, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)81 was
passed. Dodd-Frank eliminated the FRB’s power to assist individual
financial institutions.82 It also confirmed the FDIC’s power to use the
systemic risk exception and implement the broad-based eligibility

76. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM (2010),
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1025.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD76-TBQM] [hereinafter
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM].
77. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GOV’T SUPPORT FOR BANK HOLDING C OMPANIES
(2013), https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659004.pdf [hereinafter GOV’T SUPPORT FOR BANK
HOLDING COMPANIES].
78. See, e.g., Letting Lehman Go Was a Big Mistake: French Finmin, REUTERS (Oct. 8,
2008, 3:35 AM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-economy/letting-lehman-go-wasbig-mistake-french-finmin-idUSTRE49735Z20081008
[https://perma.cc/68QZ-YTT8]
(describing French Economy Minister Christine Lagarde’s criticism of the failure of the US
to rescue Lehman Brothers as “horrendous”); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-10-100, REGULATORS’ USE OF SYSTEMIC RISK EXCEPTION RAISES MORAL HAZARD
CONCERNS AND OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO CLARIFY THE PROVISION (2010),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/310/303248.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK2C-P7YP] (concluding that
although the public has criticized FDIC’s interpretation of its statutory authority under the
systemic risk exception, the FDIC had sufficient basis to rely upon the systemic risk exception
to implement broad-based eligibility programs, but recommended that Congress should
clarify FDIC’s authority under that exception).
79. GOV’T SUPPORT FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, supra note 77; TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, supra note 76.
80. GOV’T SUPPORT FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, supra note 77; TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, supra note 76.
81. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 1, 12
U.S.C. § 53 (2018).
82. Dodd-Frank § 1101(a)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 343(B)(i).
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programs.83 As a result, the ambiguities in the previous statute were
removed.84 However, this authority did not come without limitations—
the systemic risk exception can only be exercised for broad-based
programs when both the FRB and FDIC, the Secretary of Treasury in
consultation with the President, and Congress approve the program. 85
These three historical events—the Panic of 1907, Great
Depression of the 1930s, and Great Recession of 2008—helped shaped
the scope of government power to intervene during the COVID-19
pandemic.86 Most importantly, the changes under Dodd-Frank require
the PPP to only involve banks that volunteer to become PPP lenders and
meet the general requirements to participate.87
B.

Government Power to Implement the PPP

Congress created the CARES Act to administer PPP loans as
quickly as possible on a “first-come, first-served”88 basis to help small
businesses keep their employees on payroll and remain financially
viable.89 Like the FRA and EESA, the CARES Act delegated authority
to an executive agency to create an emergency loan program.90
Specifically, the CARES Act delegated authority to the SBA to
implement the PPP.91 The SBA was delegated authority to provide $659

83. See Dodd-Frank § 203, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (explaining that the FDIC “may take
other action” outside of the least cost method to liquidate a failing financial institution).
84. TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, supra note 76.
85. GOV’T SUPPORT FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, supra note 77; TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, supra note 76.
86. See Rasmussen, supra note 66 (discussing the role of government intervention in the
2008 Great Recession); see also FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 68
(explaining the role the Panic of 1907 played in creating the Federal Reserve Bank); see also
Werner, supra note 19 (describing the government intervention during the COVID-19
pandemic as one of the largest in US history).
87. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) § 1102, 15
U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(F)(ii) (West 2021) (providing the generally applicable requirements
that banks participating in PPP must implement).
88. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed.
Reg. 20811, 20813 (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/202004/PPP%20Interim%20Final%20Rule_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/X458-EPXB] (promulgating
interim final rule explaining that lenders must process PPP loans on a first-come, first-serve
basis).
89. Press Release from Maxine Waters, supra note 30.
90. CARES Act § 1102, 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36).
91. Id.
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billion for the first two rounds of the PPP.92 Congress then supplemented
the CARES Act with a third round of funding on December, 27, 2020,
through the Relief Act.93
There are several requirements in the CARES Act that applicants
must follow to be eligible for PPP loans.94 The CARES Act requires
applicants to answer two questions: (1) whether the borrower was in
business on February 15, 2020 and (2) whether the borrower had
employees for whom the borrower paid salaries and payroll taxes, or paid
independent contractors.95 Borrowers should also make a good faith
certification of their eligibility.96 Moreover, there are size limitations for
borrowers to be eligible for PPP loans.97 Borrowers must fall within the
definition of a “small business concern,” meaning a business of 500 or
fewer employees.98
However, the CARES Act offered two exceptions to the small
business concern rule.99 First, the CARES Act allowed businesses with
more than 500 employees to qualify for PPP loans if they had been
uniquely affected by the pandemic or counted as a “business concern”
under the Small Business Act.100 For example, restaurants and hotel
chains could have participated regardless of their size because they had
been uniquely affected by the pandemic due to being among the first to

92. The CARES Act Provides Assistance to Small Businesses, supra note 20.
93. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (“Relief Act”), Pub. L. No. 116–260, 134

Stat. 1182, 1993.
94. See § 636(a)(36)(G) (providing the requirements for borrower eligibility for PPP loans).
95. CARES Act § 1102(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(F)(ii)(II)(aa).
96. See CARES Act § 1102(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(G)(i)(I) (explaining that
the borrowers must make a good faith certification that their current economic uncertainty
makes their loan request necessary to support their ongoing operations, the funds will be used
to retain workers and maintain payroll or make mortgage interest payments, and utility
payments, and the applicant has not received another PPP loan).
97. See CARES Act § 1102(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(D)(i) (explaining the size
limitation for businesses applying for PPP loans).
98. CARES Act § 1102(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(D)(i)(I).
99. Id.
100. CARES Act § 1102(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(D)(i)(II) (“If applicable, the
size standard in number of employees established by the Administration for the industry in
which the business concern . . . operates.”).
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shut down.101 Second, PPP loans were also made available to nonprofit
organizations.102
The rules governing loan forgiveness depend on whether the
borrower’s loan forgiveness was granted before or after the Relief Act.
If granted before the enactment of this Act, then borrowers could have
only borrowed up to the lesser of 2.5 times their monthly payroll costs or
$10 million, and borrowers must have used this money toward payroll
and other business related expenses.103 Most importantly, 60% of the
loan needs to be used toward payroll costs if the borrowers want to be
eligible for loan forgiveness,104 and if the loan is not forgiven, then the
CARES Act allows the SBA to defer PPP loan payments for up to one
year. 105 Additionally, PPP loans are forgiven when used for payroll costs
and nonpayroll costs, such as business mortgage interest payments, rent
or lease payments, or utility payments.106
If the borrower’s loan forgiveness was granted after the Relief
Act, then loan forgiveness is applicable to additional categories of
business expenditures.107 The new categories that are covered are
operations expenditures, property damage and vandalism costs from
public disturbances during 2020, supplier costs that are part of contractual
obligations and are essential for business operations, worker protection
expenditures related to COVID-19 regulations, and employee insurance

101. Bob Davis, Big Restaurant, Hotel Chains Won Exemption to Get Small Business
Loans, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-restaurant-hotel-chainswon-exemption-to-get-small-business-loans-11586167200 [https://perma.cc/5ZUW-BL8Y]
(“While the new $350 billion Paycheck Protection Program is aimed at businesses with 500
or fewer employees, language in the $2 trillion federal stimulus bill allows big restaurant and
hotel chains to participate regardless of how many people they employ.”).
102. CARES Act § 1102(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(a)(B)(D)(i).
103. See CARES Act § 1102(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(E)(F) (explaining that
PPP loans can only be used for payroll costs, costs related to the continuation of healthcare
benefits and insurance premiums, employee salaries and commissions, interest on mortgage
obligations, interest on debt incurred before February 15, 2020, and refinancing an SBA
Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”) loan made between January 31, 2020 and April 3,
2020).
104. CARES Act § 1106, 15 U.S.C.A. § 9005(d)(8).
105. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed.
Reg. 20811, 20813 (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/202004/PPP%20Interim%20Final%20Rule_0.pdf. [https://perma.cc/X458-EPXB].
106. Id.
107. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (“Relief Act”), Pub. L. No. 116–260,
134 Stat. 1182, 2005 (adding categories of expenditures that the SBA might forgive for any
forgiveness granted after the passage of this new statute).
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if listed as payroll costs.108 PPP loans of $150,000 and less have a more
streamlined application of merely one page. 109 Finally, most PPP loans
will be forgiven.110
Moreover, the maturity of the loan depends on when the bank
provided it.111 PPP loans have a maturity of two years if the loan
originated before June 10, 2020, and five years if the loan originated after
June 10, 2020.112 To the benefit of borrowers, no interest payments were
needed until six months after the initial disbursement; however, interest
still
accrued
during
this
time.113
Congress has authorized three rounds of PPP funding to date. Congress
authorized $349 billion during the first round114 and an additional $310
billion for the second round.115 The second round of PPP funding was
needed because the funding from the first round dried up faster than
expected. 116 Congress then supplemented the CARES Act with a third
round of funding on December 27, 2020 through the Relief Act. 117

108. Id.
109. Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 116–260, 134 Stat. 1182, 1998–2000.
110. See Stacey Cowley, Small Business Loans Will be Forgiven, But Don’t Ask How, N.Y

TIMES (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/09/business/small-business-ppploans-forgiveness.html [https://perma.cc/BRF7-K6DQ] (explaining that most PPP small
business loans, especially the smallest ones, are likely to be forgiven).
111. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program—
Revisions to First Interim Final Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 36308, 36310 (June 16, 2020) (to be
codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-0616/pdf/2020-12909.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LBV-W3AE] (“If a borrower’s PPP loan is
disbursed on June 25, 2020, the 24-week period ends on December 10, 2020. If the borrower
does not submit a loan forgiveness application to its lender by October 10, 2021, the borrower
must begin making payments on or after October 10, 2021.”).
112. Id.
113. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed.
Reg. 20811, 20813 (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/202004/PPP%20Interim%20Final%20Rule_0.pdf. [https://perma.cc/X458-EPXB].
114. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) § 1102(b)(1),
15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36) (West 2021).
115. See Paycheck Protection Program and Healthcare Enhancement Act of 2020 §
101(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36) (West 2021) (providing an addition $310 billion in
funding toward the Paycheck Protection Program).
116. See Mark Niquette & Jennifer Jacobs, Small Business Relief Funds Drained Fast With
Many
Shut
Out,
BLOOMBERG NEWS
(Apr.
16,
2020,
10:33
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-16/virus-rescue-program-for-smallbusiness-runs-out-of-money [https://perma.cc/DC94-9RU8] (explaining why Congress
planned on passing a second round of PPP funding because the first round drained fast).
117. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (“Relief Act”), Pub. L. No. 116–260, 134
Stat. 1182, 2001–07.
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The Act created two loan types: (1) original PPP loans for
businesses that did not apply the first time, previously returned the loan,
or were denied the loan, and (2) PPP loans known as Second Draw Loans
for hard-hit businesses that previously received a PPP loan.118 For the
two loan types, the original PPP loan requirements outlined above and
the new requirements apply.119
One new requirement to qualify for Second Draw Loans is that
the applicant must have used the full amount of the original PPP loan by
the time the Second Draw Loan is disbursed.120 Another new requirement
is that the definition of “small business concern” has changed to mean a
business with 300 or fewer employees that can show a loss of at least a
25% reduction in revenue loss for any quarter in 2020. 121 However, that
size limitation is not applicable to restaurants and other entities that
satisfy the SBA’s alternative size requirements. 122 Finally, the SBA will
forgive Second Draw Loans based on the rules that govern loan
forgiveness after the passage of the Relief Act.123
While the CARES Act purports to give banks incentives to
participate in the PPP, it has come with unintended consequences.
Indeed, the CARES Act offers banks an incentive by paying fees for
originating loans (“origination fees”), 124 but the Act brings three notable

118. See Relief Act, 134 Stat. at 1993–2007 (providing sections 301 through 311 which are
the provisions on changes to original PPP loans and the creation of Second Draw Loans).
119. Michael Flynn, Buchalter COVID-19 Client Alert: New PPP Changes in the Stimulus
Bill: Second PPP Loan for Hardest-Hit Existing PPP Borrowers, Additional Categories of
Forgivable Expenses, Tax Deductibility for Expenses Paid with PPP Proceeds, Lender
Liability Limitations, Simplified Forgiveness Application for Loans of $150,000 or Less, and
Other
Changes,
BUCHALTER
(Dec.
28,
2020),
https://www.buchalter.com/publication/buchalter-covid-19-client-alert-new-ppp-changes-inthe-stimulus-bill-second-ppp-loan-for-hardest-hit-existing-ppp-borrowers-additionalcategories-of-forgivable-expenses-tax-deductibility-for-expe/
[https://perma.cc/WE7Y6HAT] (“Note that, along with the provisions of the Act specifically applying to Second Draw
Loans set out in this section, the provisions of the Act applicable all PPP loans set forth in the
next section below (Provisions of the Act Applying to PPP Loans Generally, Including
Second Draw Loans) also apply to Second Draw Loans.”).
120. Relief Act, 134 Stat. at 2019.
121. Relief Act, 134 Stat. at 2001.
122. See Relief Act, 134 Stat. at 2003–04 (providing entities uniquely affected by the
pandemic, such as NAICS 72 entities, meaning restaurants).
123. See Relief Act, 134 Stat. 2001–07 (adding categories of expenditures that the SBA
might forgive for any forgiveness granted after the passage of this new statute).
124. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) § 1106, 15
U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(P)(i) (West 2021) (explaining that SBA pays PPP lenders 1% for
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drawbacks. First, banks cannot request any payment from borrowers,
such as servicing fees, in addition to the money borrowers pay back on
the loan.125 Second, banks can only earn 1% interest on these loans from
borrowers.126 Third, if an agent helps a borrower with its PPP application,
demonstrated by a written agreement with the bank,127 the “agent fees
will be paid by the lender.”128 Now an important issue remains—whether
those three drawbacks are enough to reduce the profitability of PPP
loans.129
III. SERVICING LIABILITY FOR PPP LENDERS
The profitability of a bank is based in part on a bank’s net interest
margin. A reduction in the spread between a bank’s net interest income
130

originating loans of at least 2 million, 3% for loans more than $350,000 but less than $2
million, and 5% for loans not more than $350,000).
125. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed.
Reg. 20811, 20813 (Apr. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/PPP%20Interim%20Final%20Rule_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X458-EPXB].
126. Id.
127. See Juan Antonio Sanchez, PC v. Bank of South Tex., 2020 WL 6060868 at *2 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 14, 2020) (holding that PPP lenders do not owe compensation to agents who helped
PPP applicants submit their application if there is no contract to that effect); Flynn, supra note
119 (“A lender is only responsible for paying an agent’s fees in regard to services for which
the lender directly contracted with the agent.”).
128. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed.
Reg. 20811, 20816 (Apr. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/PPP%20Interim%20Final%20Rule_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X458-EPXB] (“Agent fees will be paid by the lender out of the fees the
lender receives from SBA . . . One (1) percent for loans of not more than $350,000; 0.50
percent for loans of more than $350,000 and less than $2 million; and 0.25 percent for loans
of at least $2 million.”).
129. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-701, COVID-19: FEDERAL EFFORTS
COULD BE STRENGTHENED BY TIMELY AND CONCERTED ACTIONS (2020),
https://www.gao.gov/reports/GAO-20-701/#top
[https://perma.cc/6ATB-4RK8]
(“Representatives of two associations commented that the resource demands and the lack of
clarity surrounding the application and forgiveness processes have led to lender fatigue with
the program. Representatives noted that this lender fatigue could result in members being
less likely to participate should there be future rounds of the program.”).
130. J. B. Maverick, What Is the Average Profit Margin for a Company in the Banking
Sector?,
INVESTOPEDIA,
(Aug.
26,
2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/052515/what-average-profit-margin-companybankingsector.asp#:~:text=The%20net%20interest%20margin%20is,comes%20primarily%20from
%20issuing%20loans. [https://perma.cc/DVD7-ZSN5] (“The net interest margin is, for banks,
a similar measure to gross profit margin for most companies, calculated by subtracting total
interest expense from the bank's total interest income. Interest income for banks comes
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and net interest expense stems from a declining return on the bank’s
assets, causing the margin to shrink.131 When the revenue earned from
fees and annual interest paid on the loan is less than the costs of servicing
the loan, holding the loan is not profitable.132 The higher cost that results
from servicing the loan is called servicing liability.133
Loan servicing liabilities are often the result of three things—
costs to fund the loan,134 costs to process loan applications,135 and costs
to process loan forgiveness requests.136 First, banks can borrow from the
FRB to fund loans to their customers.137 The FRB charges banks an
interest rate on the loan that is then subtracted from their net interest
income.138 Second, the servicing costs from processing loan applications
primarily from issuing loans. Interest expenses represent the interest that banks must pay on
the variety of deposit accounts held by the bank's customers.”).
131. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., OTHER ASSETS AND LIABILITIES,
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section3-7.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/EU83-PGJ7] (explaining that the “other asset or other liability categories”
shown on a bank’s balance sheet include servicing liabilities, meaning a loss of money from
servicing a bank’s assets, which reduces a bank’s net interest income).
132. Julia Kagan, Loan Servicing Definition, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/loan_servicing.asp
[https://perma.cc/APU4-J5MP]
(listing examples of loan servicing as sending monthly payment statements and collecting the
monthly payments, maintaining records of payments and balances, and collecting and paying
taxes and insurance).
133. OTHER ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, supra note 131.
134. See Julia Kagan, Cost of Funds, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 18, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/costoffunds.asp
[https://perma.cc/Q7H2-CK3W]
(analyzing the costs that lenders face to fund loans).
135. See Julia Kagan, Loan Application Fee, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 30, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/loan-applicationfee.asp#:~:text=Types%20of%20Loan%20Fees,Loan%20application%20fees&text=In%20general%2C%20fees%20help%20a,appraisal%2
0fees%2C%20and%20administration%20fees.
[https://perma.cc/MA6H-QXHW]
(explaining that lenders charge loan application fees because there are costs associated with
processing loan applications).
136. See Kevin Wack, Big Banks Call for Blanket Forgiveness of PPP Loans Under
$150,000,
AM.
BANKER,
Mar.
15,
2020,
9:37
PM,
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/big-banks-call-for-blanket-forgiveness-of-ppploans-under-150000#:~:text=In%20a%20letter%20Thursday%20to,to%20the%20banking%20trade%20grou
ps [https://perma.cc/JU8W-PZZE] (showing how PPP lenders have expressed concerns about
the costs associated with loan forgiveness, motivating them to get rid of PPP loans from their
balance sheets).
137. See Federal Reserve Act § 13, 12 U.S.C. § 347a (2018) (explaining the conditions that
member banks must comply with to receive loans through the discount window of the Federal
Reserve Banks).
138. See Ben Sabloff, Is It Easier to Ask for Forgiveness Than Permission? Not for PPP
Loans Under $150K, AQN STRATEGIES, https://www.aqnstrategies.com/aqncentral/forgive-
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come in large part from underwriting the loans. 139 Underwriting can
involve high costs to ensure that borrowers do not pose credit or interest
rate risk to banks and make sure that banks comply with their statutory
obligations.140 Third, banks pay servicing costs to process borrowers’
applications for loan forgiveness.141
Banks similarly incurred servicing costs for providing PPP
142
loans.
Some PPP lenders borrowed money from the FRB’s Paycheck
Protection Program Liquidity Facility (“PPPLF”)143 to fund the loans
they offered to borrowers.144 Borrowing from the PPPLF caused banks
to pay a servicing cost of thirty-five basis points annually on the loan.145
This cost is subtracted from the net interest income of the PPP lenders, so
thirty-five basis points are subtracted from the 1% interest rate banks earn
on PPP loans.146 Therefore, banks only earn 0.65% interest on their PPP
loans.147
PPP lenders also incur servicing costs when processing loan
applications. When processing loan applications, banks must incur labor
costs to review applications and conduct underwriting. 148 Origination

small-ppp [https://perma.cc/74X8-L62W] (last visited Sept. 13, 2020) (detailing how PPP
lenders stand to earn less than the interest rate required by the CARES Act because many
lenders themselves are paying interest on loans borrowed from the FRB).
139. Kagan, supra note 135.
140.
Caroline Banton, Underwriting, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 10, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/underwriting.asp [https://perma.cc/4FFE-P4GA].
141. C.f. Wack, supra note 136 (explaining that PPP lenders are worried about the costs of
processing loan forgiveness applications).
142. John Reosti, As PPP Enters Forgiveness Phase, Some Banks See Outsourcing As Best
Move, AM. BANKER (June 30, 2020, 4:04 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/asppp-enters-forgiveness-phase-some-banks-see-outsourcing-as-best-move
[https://perma.cc/8GHF-VC9B] (describing how some PPP lenders are trying to sell their PPP
loans on the secondary market because of the servicing costs associated with the complex
loan forgiveness process).
143. The PPPLF is authorized by the Federal Reserve Act. See Federal Reserve Act §
13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343(B)(i) (authorizing the FRB to policies and procedures to ensure
liquidity in an emergency lending program).
144. FED. RESERVE BD., PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM LIQUIDITY FACILITY (2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/ppplf.htm [https://perma.cc/9RY6-DVXS].
145. FED. RESERVE BD., PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM LIQUIDITY FACILITY TERM
SHEET
(2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/monetary20200430b1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5QCN-YB7X].
146. Sabloff, supra note 138.
147. Id.
148. Id.

2021]

PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM

221

fees only compensate banks for underwriting costs.149 Servicing the PPP
loans throughout the life of the loan also involves labor and third party
costs.150 For example, banks had to require their employees to work long
hours and on weekends to process PPP loans and service them.151
Moreover, banks had to spend money on consultants to help them process
the high volume of PPP loan applications.152
Additionally, PPP lenders face servicing costs for processing loan
forgiveness applications.153 These servicing costs are particularly
important given that most PPP loans will likely be forgiven. 154 Like the
servicing costs for processing PPP loan applications, lenders must incur
labor costs to review the PPP forgiveness applications.155 In fact, many
banks needed to outsource labor to process loan forgiveness applications
because outside companies could do so more cheaply and effectively. 156
However, since the passage of the Relief Act, servicing costs for
smaller PPP loans have reduced. The forgiveness process for smaller

149. Id.; see also Ryan Abdoo & Joe Vloedman, PPP Loans:What Financial Institutions
Need to Know Related to Accounting, PLANTE MORAN (July 30, 2020),
https://www.plantemoran.com/explore-our-thinking/insight/2020/07/ppp-loans-whatfinancial-institutions-need-to-know-related-to-accounting [https://perma.cc/V2P8-PVR4].
150. See Reosti, supra note 142 (explaining that many banks are incentivized to sell their
PPP loan portfolios because of the high servicing costs that come from devoting employees
and third party resources to processing PPP loans).
151. See Brian Schaffer, PPP Loan Processors May Be Owed Significant Wages, FITAPELLI
& SCHAFFER BLOG, https://www.fslawfirm.com/blog/2020/05/ppp-loan-processors-may-beowed-significant-wages/ [https://perma.cc/68R3-HPWN] (last visited Feb. 5, 2021)
(describing the long work hours for many bank employees, including those who do not
normally perform loan processing functions, because of the high demand for PPP loans).
152. Reosti, supra note 142.
153. Wack, supra note 136.
154. See SMALL BUS. ADMIN., 1.1 MILLION PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM LOANS
FORGIVEN SO FAR TOTALING OVER $100 BILLION (Jan.
12, 2021),
https://www.sba.gov/article/2021/jan/12/11-million-paycheck-protection-program-loansforgiven-so-far-totaling-over-100billion#:~:text=1.1%20Million%20Paycheck%20Protection%20Program%20Loans%20For
given%20So%20Far%20Totaling%20Over%20%24100%20Billion
[https://perma.cc/PLT5-7EE9] (detailing the fast pace of loan forgiveness).
155. See Reosti, supra note 142 (reporting that some PPP lenders like Atlantic Union have
spent money on outside companies to process loan forgiveness applications because they do
not have enough personnel to meet the labor intensive costs).
156. See id. (explaining that some banks have outsourced the processing of loan
forgiveness applications because outside companies can focus exclusively on processing loan
forgiveness applications, making the process more efficient, and outsourcing is also more
cheap because the outside companies offer discounts).
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loans has become more clear and streamlined.157 Banks expend fewer
labor costs on PPP loans of less than $150,000 because banks only need
to review a 1-page forgiveness application. 158 Moreover, the statute
requires the SBA to reimburse lenders for a portion of the servicing costs
for disbursing smaller PPP loans.159 PPP loans of $50,000 or less have a
higher percentage of their servicing costs reimbursed.160 The lesser of
50% or $2,500 at the time of disbursement of the loan is reimbursed.161
By contrast, loans of not more than $350,000 and greater than $350,00
are reimbursed at 3% and 5% of the total loan size, respectively, at the
time of disbursement.162 For these reasons, the servicing costs for smaller
PPP loans have been reduced. In other words, banks have higher
servicing costs for larger PPP loans.
Presumably due to the higher labor costs and lower
reimbursement for servicing larger PPP loans, larger banks are
anticipating less profits from their participation in the PPP.163 Because
larger banks were more likely to originate loans above $150,000,164 they
must navigate a more complex loan forgiveness process, bringing
additional labor costs to process those loan forgiveness applications.
Moreover, larger banks are more likely to provide loans of more than
$50,000,165 and these are the loans that the SBA reimburses a smaller
proportion of.166 Smaller banks, however, will have much lower labor
and third-party consultancy costs associated with processing loan
forgiveness applications because they tend to give out much smaller

157. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (“Relief Act”), Pub. L. No. 116–260, 134
Stat. 1182, 1998–2000.
158. See id. (providing a simplified loan forgiveness process, presumably lowering
servicing costs).
159. Relief Act, 134 Stat. at 2006.
160. See id. (comparing the reimbursement of servicing costs for PPP loans of $50,000 or
less to PPP loans of up to $350,000 and greater than $350,000).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Cowley, supra note 51 (reporting that larger PPP lenders are anticipating less
profits from their participation in the program).
164.
See
2020
Paycheck
Protection
Program
Rep.
at
7,
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/SBA-Paycheck-Protection-Program-LoanReport-Round2.pdf?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery [https://perma.cc/TJ5RRTE6] (showing that the top fifteen PPP lenders, which include the largest banks in the
country, originated average loan sizes of close to $150,000).
165. Id.
166. Relief Act, 134 Stat. at 2006.
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loans.167 Accordingly, the Relief Act will most likely cause higher
servicing liabilities for larger banks.
Although the three primary costs of servicing liability—costs to
fund the loan, costs to process loan applications, and costs to process loan
forgiveness requests—pose an operational risk to PPP lenders, lenders at
least have some certainty of how to mitigate this liability.168 For instance,
banks can remove PPP loans from their balance sheet to end their
servicing liability.169 Removing PPP loans free up the bank’s balance
sheet for more profitable loans and allow banks to recognize their fee
revenue sooner.170
A bank can remove PPP loans from the balance sheet in four
ways. First, the SBA can forgive the PPP loan by paying the bank the
loan’s principal and interest if the borrower meets certain conditions.171
Because the SBA is expected to forgive most PPP loans,172 most banks
will be able to remove PPP loans from their balance sheet. However, the
process to do so will be more costly for larger banks because they hold
comparatively larger sized PPP loans.173 Second, a bank can sell PPP
loans to nonbank lenders in the secondary market.174 Third, the borrower
can default on the PPP loan, causing the SBA to pay the bank the
remainder of the loan principal and interest. 175 Fourth, the borrower can
pay the principal and interest for the PPP loan, bringing the servicing
costs to an end at a maximum of five years. 176

167. Danielle Kurtzleben, Not-So-Small Businesses Continue To Benefit From PPP Loans,
NPR (May 4, 2020, 5:51 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/04/850177240/not-so-smallbusinesses-continue-to-benefit-from-ppp-loans [https://perma.cc/87AH-D3GM].
168. See Wack, supra note 136 (explaining the reasons banks want to sell off their PPP
loans to free up assets on their balance sheet).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) § 1102, 15
U.S.C.A. § § 9005(d)(8) (West 2021) (providing the loan forgiveness requirements).
172. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 154.
173. 2020 Paycheck Protection Program Rep., supra note 164.
174. Wack, supra note 136.
175. See CARES Act § 1106, 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(B) (2020) (describing what SBA
does in the event a PPP borrower defaults).
176. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program—
Revisions to First Interim Final Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 36308, 3610 (June 16, 2020),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-06-16/pdf/2020-12909.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9LBV-W3AE].
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However, banks have little certainty of how to resolve another
type of liability—lawsuits under common law.177 Banks face lender
liability in addition to servicing liability because they serviced PPP loan
applications in a manner that is perceived to be unfair by denied
applicants and agents of borrowers. 178
IV. LENDER LIABILITY FOR PPP LENDERS
Banks serviced PPP loans contrary to the expectations of
applicants and agents, causing these disgruntled groups to bring claims
under common law theories179 similar to those previously brought against
banks in the past.180 PPP borrowers must rely on common law theories
of liability because the CARES Act does not grant a private right of action
to private plaintiffs.181 There are three theories of liability that are firmly
established in case law on lender liability, and these theories frequently
ground the claims brought against PPP lenders—intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage, negligence, and unjust
enrichment.182 For claims brought under the theory of negligence, for
example, lender liability typically stems from a lender’s conduct that falls
below the standards of reasonable care, causing injury to a borrower. 183
In First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Caudle,184 a lender was found
177. See Travisano, supra note 47 (listing many criticisms which members of the public
have of PPP lenders).
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Profiles, Inc. v. Bank of America Corp., 453 F. Supp. 3d 742 (D. Md. Apr.
13, 2020) (adjudicating PPP loan applicant’s claim that Bank of America was liable on the
common law theory of negligence for not processing PPP loan applications on a first-come,
first-serve basis, contrary to the expectations of small businesses).
180. See, e.g., First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Caudle, 425 So. 2d. 1050, 1052–1053
(Ala. 1982) (holding that a lender was liable for negligence at common law for failing to
process the borrower’s loan application with reasonable care).
181. See, e.g., Profiles, at 751–752 (dismissing claim that PPP lenders violated the CARES
Act because Congress did not intend a private right of action).
182. See, e.g., Complaint for Plaintiff at 24–27, 29–31, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020) (alleging that
Chase is liable for interfering with the plaintiff’s economic advantage, being negligent, and
being unjustly enriched); see also Complaint for Plaintiff, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v.
Wells Fargo & Co. et al., No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May
22, 2020) (suing Wells Fargo on the common law theory of negligence).
183. See, e.g., Caudle, at 1051 (holding on a borrower’s claim of negligence that a lender
failed to process the borrower’s loan application with reasonable care, causing injury to the
borrower by being forced to receive a more expensive loan at another bank).
184. 425 So. 2d 1050 (Ala. 1982).
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liable for failing to process a loan application with reasonable care. 185
The lender had purported to accept the borrower’s application for a
government sponsored loan when it instead had denied that loan.186 That
denial caused injury to the borrower by requiring the borrower to obtain
a less advantageous, higher interest loan at another bank. 187
Likewise, negligence claims brought by denied applicants
contend that PPP lenders should be found liable for failing to process PPP
loan applications with reasonable care.188 The denied applicants argue
that the conduct of the lenders fell below the standard of “reasonable
care” because the lenders had instead prioritized the processing of
applications for preexisting customers.189 In the eyes of the denied
applicants, banks should have processed PPP loan applications on a “first
come, first served” basis.190 Prioritizing preexisting customers arguably
caused injury by requiring denied applicants to obtain less advantageous,
lower valued PPP loans at other banks.191 Because many denied
applicants have felt the same way, class action lawsuits have been
brought against PPP lenders.192
Moreover, banks may face liability at common law for claims
brought by the agents who helped borrowers with their application. 193
Those agents have brought claims compelling PPP lenders to compensate
them because the agents helped lenders provide PPP loans by assisting

185. Id. at 1050.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Complaint for Plaintiff at 24–25, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. JPMorgan

Chase Bank, N.A., No. 1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020).
189. Id.
190. Complaint for Plaintiff at 24–25, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A., No. 1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020) (claiming that Chase was
dishonest for knowing that it would favor “commercial clients” for PPP loan applications
while advertising to the public that they were “an SBA-affiliated lender willing and able to
process PPP loan applications”).
191. See, e.g., id. at 25 (pleading facts that the denied applicants had to obtain less
advantageous PPP loans at other banks).
192. See, e.g., id. (class action complaint); see also Complaint for Plaintiff at 4, Karen’s
Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020
WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020) (class action complaint).
193.
See,
e.g.,
2020 SEC WELLS FARGO 10-Q REP.
at
123,
https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/secfilings/2020/second-quarter-10q.pdf (reporting in its quarterly report that Wells Fargo is
increasingly facing lawsuits related to its participation in PPP, such as class action lawsuits
brought by agents of the borrowers).
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borrowers in submitting their loan applications.194 One common law
theory that frequently grounds those types of claims is unjust
enrichment.195 Class action lawsuits have also surfaced in this context.196
Although PPP lenders may be held liable to denied applicants and
agents, the likelihood of lender liability is low for three reasons. First,
courts are unlikely to allow class action lawsuits to proceed, 197 thus
reducing the higher likelihood of recovery that plaintiffs typically enjoy
in class action lawsuits.198 Second, plaintiffs have a low likelihood of
recovery on the most frequent ongoing common law claims of intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage and negligence
brought by denied applicants.199 Third, plaintiffs have a low likelihood
of recovery on agents’ common law claim of unjust enrichment. 200
A.

Limited Likelihood of Success for Class Action Lawsuits

Courts are unlikely to allow class action lawsuits to proceed.
Denied applicants and agents are unlikely to satisfy the prerequisites
which courts require for class action lawsuits. Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, one prerequisite for class action lawsuits is that there
must be a class representative that can adequately represent the interests
of a class,201 known as the “adequacy” requirement.202 A class
representative can satisfy the adequacy requirement when he or she
194. See, e.g., Juan Antonio Sanchez, PC v. Bank of South Tex., 2020 WL 6060868 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 14, 2020) (involving claims of unjust enrichment brought against a PPP lender).
195. See, e.g., id. (dismissing an agent’s claim involving unjust enrichment against a PPP
lender); see also Johnson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 20-CV-4100 (JSR), 2020 WL
5608683 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2020) (involving an agent’s claim of unjust enrichment); see
also Steven L. Steward & Assocs., P.A. v. Truist Bank, No. 620CV1083ORL40GJK, 2020
WL 5939150 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2020) (involving an agent’s claim of unjust enrichment).
196. See Complaint for Plaintiff at 7, Panda Group, PC v. Bank of America, C.D. Utah
(2020) (No. 4:20-cv-00045-DN) (providing an example of a class action complaint brought
by a group of agents).
197. See infra Part IV.A.
198. Class Action Lawsuits Seem Good But Have a Lot of Drawbacks that Don't Make
Them Very Ideal, NORTH CAROLINA CONSUMERS COUNCIL (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://www.ncconsumer.org/news-articles-eg/class-action-lawsuits-sound-like-a-goodthing-but-they-arent-always-that-great-for-you.html [https://perma.cc/9UPA-F25Q] (“When
many plaintiffs with the same issue combine together to form a class, each person has a better
chance of recovering compensation when they may not have been able to do as individuals.”).
199. See infra Part IV.B.
200. See infra Part IV.C.
201. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
202. Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 267 (2d Cir. 2006).
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possesses the same interest and suffers the same injury as the class
members.203 Another prerequisite is that there must be enough common
questions of fact underlying the claims of each plaintiff in the class.204
Some common law claims naturally do not involve enough common
questions of fact, such as claims of unjust enrichment.205
Here, plaintiffs who are denied PPP applicants cannot satisfy the
adequacy requirement. Denied applicants cannot satisfy this requirement
because they do not possess the same interest or suffer the same injury as
the rest of the prospective class.206 For example, the facts pleaded in a
class action complaint brought against JP Morgan Chase (“Chase”) bank
suggested that the denied applicants did not all possess the same interest
because each applicant needed different loan amounts.207 Furthermore,
the PPP applicants did not suffer the same injury because each applicant’s
potential economic loss would vary depending on the size of their
business.208
Moreover, courts are unlikely to grant a class certification for
agents because their common law claims do not share enough common
questions of fact.209 For example, Sport & Wheat, CPA, PA v. ServisFirst
Bank, Inc.210 prevented certification of a class of agents in part because
203. E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys. Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977) (“As this
Court has repeatedly held, a class representative must be part of the class and possess the same
interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.”).
204. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
205. See Sport & Wheat, CPA, PA v. ServisFirst Bank, Inc., 2020 WL 4882416 at fn. *14
(N.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2020) (Dkt. #57) (describing how the common law claim of unjust
enrichment is not adept for class action certification); see also Vega v. T-Mobile, USA, Inc.,
564 F.3d 1256, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ommon questions will rarely, if ever, predominate
an unjust enrichment claim, the resolution of which turns on individualized facts.”).
206. C.f. Profiles, Inc. v. Bank of America Corp., 453 F. Supp. 3d 742, 754 (D. Md. Apr.
13, 2020) (describing denied PPP applicants as generally suffering different injuries because
the reasons for why applicants are denied may be different).
207. See Complaint for Plaintiff at 18, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A., No. 1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020) (pleading facts that Sha-Poppin
would be able to keep its business open for a fraction of an eight-week window by acquiring
a loan of $6,000, whereas Hawkins-Armstrong would not be able to do so with that same loan
amount).
208. See id. (admitting in class action complaint that Sha-Poppin would be able to survive
for part of an eight-week time window with a small loan of $6,000, unlike HawkinsArmstrong which suffered a much greater injury by receiving the same loan amount but did
so anyways because it was “desperate”).
209. See Sport & Wheat, CPA, PA v. ServisFirst Bank, Inc., 2020 WL 4882416 at *fn. 14
(N.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2020) (describing that common questions of fact are rarely found in unjust
enrichment claims).
210. 2020 WL 4882416 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2020).
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the underlying unjust enrichment claim did not involve common
questions of fact.211 There were no common questions of fact because
each agent pursued different damages from the PPP lender and the lender
had different knowledge for whether applications were submitted with an
agent’s help.212
Courts are also unlikely to allow class action lawsuits to proceed
because they will most likely compel resolution of those claims in
arbitration, a process that is frequently more favorable banks.213 The
threshold question for determining whether a claim is arbitrable is
typically one for the court to decide unless both parties unambiguously
agree that only an arbitrator can make that determination.214 The majority
of courts consider that the express incorporation of American Arbitration
Rules in a contract is indicative of this unambiguous agreement. 215 For
211. See id. (explaining that unjust enrichment claims rarely, if ever, involve common
questions of fact).
212. See id. (implying that there were not enough common questions of fact on the agents’
claim of unjust enrichment presumably because two components of that unjust enrichment
claim—that the lender had knowledge of the agents helping applicants and caused damages—
did not involve enough common questions of fact).
213. See Imre Stephen Szalai, The Prevalence of Consumer Arbitration Agreements by
America’s Top Companies, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 244–245 (2019) (discussing that
companies often use the arbitration process by including one-sided terms in arbitration clauses
of contracts that benefit the company, such as terms that require arbitration to take place in
only one location or that claims must be brought within a very short period of time); see also
Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a “Privatization of the Justice
System,”
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
1,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-ofthe-justice-system.html [https://perma.cc/Q8EW-5BBV] (examining records of over 25,000
arbitration cases between 2010 and 2014 to conclude that the arbitration process is “a rigged
system of expediency” that often favors the businesses like banks that add an arbitration
clause to the contract, because arbitrators feel the need to rule on behalf of them to retain their
business).
214. See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942–46 (1995)
(holding that parties are presumed not to have agreed to arbitrate questions of arbitrability
unless the parties clearly and unmistakably agree to submit arbitrability questions to
arbitration); see also Crawford Prof’l Drugs, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 748 F.3d 249, 261
(5th Cir. 2014) (“[I]f the parties have clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate arbitrability,
certain threshold questions—such as whether a particular claim is subject to arbitration—are
for the arbitrator, and not a court, to decide.”).
215. See, e.g., Apollo Comput., Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 473–74 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding
that parties agreeing to have all disputes resolved according to the International Chamber of
Arbitration rules, which are similar to the American Arbitration Rules, constitutes “clear and
unmistakable” evidence that the parties decided to arbitrate arbitrability); see also Contec
Corp. v. Remote Solution, Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen . . . parties
explicitly incorporate rules that empower an arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability, the
incorporation serves as clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate such
issues to an arbitrator.”); see also Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co.,
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example, DNM Contracting, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank216 compelled
arbitration for a PPP applicant’s claims in part because of Wells Fargo’s
express incorporation of American Arbitration Rules in contracts which
applicants agreed to when applying for new business accounts to receive
PPP loans.217
Like Wells Fargo, many PPP lenders have incorporated the
American Arbitration Rules in contracts which applicants must agree to
when applying for PPP loans.218 Therefore, courts will similarly compel
applicants’ claims against PPP lenders to be resolved in arbitration
because many PPP lenders have incorporated those rules into agreements
with PPP applicants.219 But even when assuming that plaintiffs
successfully certify a class for a class action, banks will have limited
liability exposure to both PPP applicants220 and agents.221
B.

Limited Likelihood of Lender Liability to PPP Applicants

PPP lenders have limited lender liability exposure to applicants.
Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of the two common law
claims based in tort that are most frequently raised against PPP lenders—
687 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012) (joining sister circuits that the “express adoption” of the
American Arbitration Rules constitutes “clear and unmistakable” evidence that the parties
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability); see also Fallo v. High-Tech Inst., 559 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir.
2009) (“[W]e conclude that the arbitration provision’s incorporation of the AAA Rules . . .
constitutes a clear and unmistakable expression of the parties’ intent to leave the question of
arbitrability to an arbitrator.”).
216. No. 4:20–CV–1790 (S.D. Tex. 2020).
217. DNM Contracting, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 4:20-CV-1790 (S.D. Tex. 2020)
(“Because the Arbitration Agreement expressly incorporates AAA rules, the Court finds
“clear and unmistakable evidence” that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.”).
218. See, e.g., Online Services Agreement, JP MORGAN CHASE (May 20, 2018),
https://www.chase.com/content/dam/mobile/en/legacy/documents/legal-docs/COLSA2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6F9J-HY6M] (“The party filing a Claim(s) in arbitration must file its
Claim(s) before JAMS or the American Arbitration Association under the rules of such
arbitration administrator in effect at the time the Claim(s) was filed. Rules and forms may be
obtained from, and Claims made may be filed with JAMS (800.352.5267 or jamsadr.com) or
the American Arbitration Association (800-778-7879 or www.adr.org).”).
219. See, e.g., Deposit Account Agreement, WELLS FARGO (Nov. 9, 2020),
https://www.wellsfargo.com/fetch-pdf?formNumber=CCB2018C&subProductCode=ANY
[https://perma.cc/C3LB-ZZWZ] (“Wells Fargo and you each agree that the arbitration will:
Proceed in a location mutually agreeable to Wells Fargo and you, or if the parties cannot
agree, in a location selected by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in the state
whose laws govern your account.”).
220. See infra Part IV.B.
221. See infra Part IV.C.
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intentional interference with prospective economic advantage and
negligence. 222 Both common law claims are grounded on PPP lenders’
purported prioritization of existing customers instead of processing loan
applications on a “first come, first served” basis.223 One notable
difference is that intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage is centered on a plaintiff’s loss of an expected result, 224
whereas negligence speaks to the reasonableness of the defendant’s
underlying conduct.225 Ultimately plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on
these common law claims, and therefore PPP lenders may deal first with
their existing customers when processing PPP loan applications.
Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. Chase226 is an example of
an ongoing lawsuit under the theory of intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage and arises under Illinois common
law.227 Finding lender liability on that theory in Illinois depends on
whether the following elements are satisfied: (1) the existence of a valid
business relationship or expectancy; (2) the defendants’ knowledge of the
plaintiff's business expectancy; (3) purposeful interference by the
defendants that prevents the plaintiff's legitimate expectancy from
ripening into a valid business relationship or termination of the
relationship; and (4) damages to plaintiff resulting from such
interference.228
222. See, e.g., Complaint for Plaintiff at 26–27, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020) (claiming that Chase
bank is liable under the theory of intentional interference with prospective advantage).
223. See id. (contending that Chase intentionally interfered with the plaintiff’s business
expectancy of receiving a PPP loan by purposely prioritizing existing customers and not
processing loan applications on a first come, first serve basis); see also Response Brief at 12–
13, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., No. 20-cv-956, complaint
filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020) (arguing that Wells Fargo negligently
implemented the PPP).
224. See Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill.2d 460, 484, 693 N.E.2d 358, 380 (1998)
(providing the four elements of the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage in which all four elements relate to whether the plaintiff had a valid business
expectancy).
225. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a) (providing a rationale for negligence lawsuits as
incentivizing everyone to be conscious of exercising “ordinary care” when managing their
property or person to prevent injuries to himself or others).
226. Complaint, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No.
1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020).
227. See id. (bringing a lawsuit against a PPP lender in the Northern District Court of
Illinois).
228. Gleason, at 484, 693 N.E.2d at 380 (defining the elements of intentional interference
with economic advantage in Illinois common law).
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For a plaintiff to satisfy the first element, the pattern in Illinois
and other states’ case law is the fact that the defendant has interfered with
the business expectancy the plaintiff had with a third party who is not
subject to the underlying claim.229 A party can show the existence of a
valid business expectancy with a third party when there is a reasonable
likelihood that the expectancy will actually occur. 230 For example, a valid
business expectancy could be receiving financing from a lender.231 In
Trepel v. Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp.,232 the claimant adequately pleaded
that there was a reasonable likelihood of their expectancy to receive a
government loan on time to actually occur, but the opposing party’s
interference prevented that expectancy from coming into fruition.233 The
hospital had pleaded that, although their loan application met the
statutory criteria for loan approval, and the lender had already approved
their loan, the doctor delayed the lender’s ability to provide it by filing
complaints describing the hospital’s defects to state agencies. 234
Determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied the second
element—defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s business
expectancy—is fairly straightforward. 235 Like the first element, Illinois

229. See, e.g., Dowd and Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 352 Ill.2d 365, 382–383, 816 N.E.2d 754,
769 (Ill. App. 2004) (holding that the defendant law firm prevented the plaintiff attorney, a
fired attorney from that firm, from having third party Allstate as a client by improperly
inducing Allstate to stop doing business with plaintiff attorney); see also Trepel v. Pontiac
Osteopathic Hosp., 135 Mich. App. 361, 377–378, 354 N.W.2d 341, 348 (Mich. App. 1984)
(holding that the defendant hospital adequately pleaded the tort of intentional interference
with economic advantage against the counter-defendant doctor who interfered with the
hospital’s ability to receive financing from a third party).
230. See, e.g., Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill.2d 399, 407–408, 667 N.E.2d 1296,
1299–1300 (Ill. 1996) (explaining that there is no reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff’s
expectancy of receiving a job offer would actually occur because merely receiving good
references and comments of being a “leading candidate” and “‘seriously considered’ for the
job” are not guarantees but simply informal assurances of good will).
231. See Trepel, at 377–378, 354 N.W.2d at 348 (discussing the existence of a valid
business expectancy for a loan where a lender such as the Michigan State Hospital Finance
Authority approves of a loan in advance).
232. 135 Mich. App. 361, 354 N.W.2d 341 (1984).
233. See id. (holding that the hospital adequately pled in their counterclaim that there was
a reasonable expectation that their bond would be approved).
234. See id. (describing that a trier of fact could reasonably conclude from the facts of the
defendant’s counterclaim that the Michigan State Hospital Finance Authority had a reasonable
likelihood of approving the defendant’s bond).
235. See, e.g., Dowd and Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 352 Ill.2d 365, 382, 816 N.E.2d 754, 769
(Ill. App. 2004) (reasoning in one brief sentence how the second element of the tort of
intentional interference with economic advantage is satisfied).
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courts focus on whether the defendant has knowledge of the plaintiff’s
business expectancy with a third party.236
Additionally, Illinois courts have established a test to determine
whether the third and fourth elements are satisfied.237 More specifically,
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant not only took the action to
intentionally interfere with the plaintiff’s business expectancy, but also
acted with the purpose to harm the plaintiff’s business.238 What is more,
Illinois courts find that the third element is not satisfied when the
defendant can identify a reasonable purpose for his or her action that is
not harming the plaintiff’s expectancy. 239 Finally, Illinois law requires
plaintiffs to show for the fourth element that the damages they received
are not speculative but can be attributable to the defendant’s conduct “to
a reasonable degree of certainty.”240
Based on this case law, the plaintiffs in Sha-Poppin have
described in their complaint that all four elements can be satisfied. 241 The
plaintiffs argue that the first element can be satisfied because PPP
applicants had a valid business expectancy to receive financing “that was
critical to their survival during the COVID-19 pandemic.”242 In fact, the
plaintiffs believe that there was a reasonable likelihood that this

236. See id. (“Dowd enjoyed a 15–year business relationship with Allstate. As partners and
shareholders, defendants were undeniably aware of this relationship and its lucrative benefit
to Dowd.”); see also Bullet Express, Inc. v. New Way Logistics, Inc., 70 N.E.3d 251, 264,
410 Ill.Dec. 434, 447 (2016) (describing how the defendant knew of the “longstanding
relationship” between plaintiff and third party).
237. See, e.g., Atanus v. American Airlines, Inc., 403 Ill. App. 3d 549, 557, 932 N.E.2d
1044, 1051 (2010) (“[P]laintiff must establish facts indicating that the defendants acted with
the aim of interfering with plaintiff's expectancy.”).
238. See, e.g., Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill.2d 460, 485, 693 N.E.2d 358, 371
(1998) (“[A] plaintiff must show not merely that the defendant has succeeded in ending the
[business] relationship or interfering with the [business] expectancy, but “purposeful
interference”–that the defendant has committed some impropriety in doing so.”).
239. See, e.g., Atanus, at 557–558, 932 N.E.2d at 1051 (stating that the defendant employer
shared information on plaintiff employee’s work hours with another employer of plaintiff for
the reasonable purpose of determining whether employee was working for both employers at
the same time, not to get employee fired).
240. See, e.g., Dowd and Dowd, at 383, 816 N.E.2d at 770 (“A plaintiff must prove
damages to a reasonable degree of certainty, and evidence cannot be remote, speculative, or
uncertain.”).
241. See, e.g., Complaint at 27, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. JPMorgan Chase
Bank, No. 1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020) (stating a claim that all four elements of
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage can be satisfied).
242. Complaint at 27, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No.
1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020).
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expectancy would have actually occurred if Chase had reviewed their
PPP loan applications according to the PPP’s requirement to review on a
“first come, first serve basis”243 rather than “systematically prioritize[]
larger and more prestigious commercial clients over Plaintiffs.”244 The
plaintiffs then purport to show the defendant’s knowledge of a plaintiff’s
business expectancy to satisfy the second element, stating that Chase had
knowledge of the applicants’ business expectancy when agreeing to the
requirements of the PPP and accepting PPP loan applications from
borrowers.245
The plaintiffs in Sha-Poppin then argue that the third element is
satisfied by showing that the bank acted with the purpose to interfere with
the applicants’ expectancy by favoring applicants of commercial
clients.246 By favoring other customers, the argument continues that the
fourth element is satisfied because Chase’s interference proximately
caused damage to the borrowers that is not speculative because the
borrowers had to obtain loans at other banks based on conduct directly
attributable to Chase’s failure to properly processing their applications.247
The applicants believe that they would have received much needed PPP
loans sooner if Chase had properly processed their loan applications on a
first come, first serve basis.248
Applying this case law to the facts pleaded in the complaint of
Sha-Poppin, the complaint’s analysis of the four elements is most likely
incorrect. The plaintiffs probably cannot satisfy the first element by
showing that they have a valid business expectancy to receive PPP loans
243. See, e.g., Complaint at 26-27, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A., No. 1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020) (alleging in lawsuit that JP Morgan
Chase misrepresented the loan eligibility for their PPP loans, allowing PPP borrowers to
believe that they would have their PPP loans reviewed on a first come, first serve basis).
244. Id. at 27.
245. See id. at 26–27 (“Defendant Chase was aware of the expectancy, to the extent it
received a PPP loan application from Plaintiff and the putative Class or otherwise had direct
and specific knowledge that they intended to apply for a PPP loan.”).
246. Id. at 26–27 (“Defendant Chase intentionally interfered in Plaintiff’s and the putative
Class’ prospective business by allowing other PPP loan applicants to cut in front of them in
the application line, and indeed, by systematically prioritizing larger and more prestigious
commercial clients over Plaintiff and the putative class.”).
247. See id. at 27 (alleging that as a proximate cause of JPMorgan Chase Bank’s conduct,
the plaintiffs were not able to obtain PPP loans from that bank and instead had to obtain
smaller PPP loans from other banks).
248. See id. at 27 (“As a proximate result of Chase’s misconduct, Plaintiff and the putative
class were not able to obtain PPP loans they otherwise were qualified to receive, or were only
able to obtain much smaller loans elsewhere.”).
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from Chase. In this case, unlike the case law, the plaintiffs lack a business
expectancy with a third party. In Trepel, the claimant adequately pleaded
a valid business expectancy with a lender that was not subject to the
claim, and that expectancy would have actually occurred if the opposing
party had not interfered.249 By contrast, here the PPP applicants have
stated their claim against Chase who is the opposing party itself, not a
third party.
Even assuming that a plaintiff does not need to state a valid
business expectancy with a third party, the plaintiffs fail to state a valid
business expectancy. The claimants in Trepel had a valid business
expectancy to receive a loan because their loan had already been
approved and was simply delayed due to the opposing party’s conduct. 250
But here, although many of the PPP loan applications were denied despite
meeting the statutory criteria,251 Chase had not guaranteed the acceptance
of any particular PPP loan application.252 Furthermore, Chase had not
even guaranteed that it would process any application.253 Because the
plaintiffs do not state a claim against a third party, the plaintiffs most
likely cannot satisfy the first element.
For the second element, plaintiffs cannot show that Chase had
knowledge of the plaintiff’s business expectancy to receive a PPP loan
application. Although a lender may infer from a loan application that an
applicant wishes to receive the loan, a lender cannot infer that the
applicants are guaranteed a loan. The plaintiffs’ claim shares a similar
flaw in their reasoning of the first element—reasoning that a business
249. See Trepel v. Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp., 135 Mich. App. 361, 377–378, 354 N.W.2d
341, 348 (1984) (holding that the defendant hospital adequately pled in their counterclaim
that there was a reasonable expectation that their bond would be approved).
250. See id. (describing that a trier of fact could reasonably conclude from the facts of the
defendant’s counterclaim that the Michigan State Hospital Finance Authority had a reasonable
likelihood of approving the defendant’s bond).
251. See Complaint at 27, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., No. 1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020) (stating that the PPP applications that were
denied would have otherwise been accepted, therefore implying that the applications met the
PPP statutory criteria).
252. See Paycheck Protection Program and Chase Business Bank: Frequently Asked
Questions, https://recovery.chase.com/cares1/ppp-faqs1 (last visited Dec. 6, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/6JDX-2GKS] (answering on a frequently asked questions page that many
PPP applications were denied because of the huge volume of applications).
253. See Complaint at 27, Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., No. 1:20-cv-02523 (N. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020) (stating that Chase bank was unable to process
all PPP loan applications during the first round of PPP funding because of the huge volume
of applications).
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expectancy with the defendant is the legal equivalent of a business
expectancy with a third party.254 Therefore, the plaintiffs cannot satisfy
the second element.
Moreover, the plaintiffs cannot show that the defendant purposely
interfered with the plaintiffs’ business expectancy to satisfy the third
element. The PPP borrowers cannot prove that defendant Chase acted
with the purpose to harm the plaintiff’s expectancy because Chase can
identify a valid purpose for their action.255 Indeed, Chase most likely
processed PPP loan applications with the purpose of processing loans as
fast as possible.256 In fact, processing PPP loan applications as fast as
possible was one of the critical aims of the PPP.257
The plaintiffs are also unlikely to satisfy the fourth element,
proving that damages resulted from Chase’s particular conduct. In the
complaint, the plaintiffs could have only referenced aggregate SBA data
showing the value of PPP loans that lenders approved. 258 Accordingly,
the applicable law calls for no damages to be awarded because the only
available evidence illustrates PPP lenders’ conduct overall, not Chase’s
particular conduct.259 Because neither the fourth element nor any of the
previous elements can be satisfied, the plaintiffs in Sha-Poppin are
unlikely to recover on the theory of intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage.
Another claim facing PPP lenders arises under the theory of
negligence. 260 Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co.261
254. See id. (alleging that the defendant, Chase, interfered with the applicants’ expectancy
to receive PPP loans from Chase but not a third party).
255. See Waters, supra note 28 (describing the involvement of the private sector for PPP
lending).
256. See id. (describing the involvement of the private sector for PPP lending).
257. See id. (describing the involvement of the private sector for PPP lending).
258. See Response Brief at 12–13, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co.
et al., No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020) (criticizing
a plaintiff’s complaint in a different lawsuit for only citing to aggregate SBA data, making
proving damages too speculative).
259.
See
Paycheck
Protection
Program
(PPP)
Rep.,
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/PPP_Report%20-%202020-08-10-508.pdf
(Aug. 8, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ZU2N-H486] (providing aggregate data on PPP lenders
through August 8, 2020).
260. See Response Brief at 12–13, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co.
et al., No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020)
(responding to a complaint alleging negligence of a PPP lender).
261. See Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., No. 20-cv-956,
complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020).
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is a claim that arises under California common law. 262 Claims of
negligence under California common law succeed when the following
elements are satisfied: “(1) the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff, (2)
the defendant breached this duty, this breach proximately caused the
damage to the plaintiff, and (3) there is a compensable recovery that can
be awarded to the plaintiff.”263
Although California courts typically do not impose a duty on
lenders in a lender-borrower relationship above an arms-length
relationship,264 courts have taken the position that lenders have both a
statutory and a common law duty in certain circumstances.265 California
has only one statute that imposes a duty on a lender, which is a fiduciary
duty to the borrower when acting as a mortgage broker.266 Federal
statutes can only impose a duty when there is an implied private right of
action.267
Moreover, a common law duty may be imposed on lenders when
two scenarios are present: (1) when the lender in a transaction acts as
more than “a mere lender of money,” such as by pressuring the borrower
to enter into a loan agreement or by being actively involved in the
financial enterprise at issue, or (2) while being “confined to their
traditional scope,” a duty exists for a lender under Biankanja v. Irving268

262. See Response Brief at 12–13, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co.
et al., No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020)
(responding to a complaint alleging negligence of a PPP lender under California common
law).
263. Lueras v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, 221 Cal. App. 4th 49, 62 (2013); see also
Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a) (“[E]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful
acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the
management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of
ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.”).
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., Alvarez v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 228 Cal. App. 4th 941, 944
(2014) (explaining that a lender may owe a duty to a borrower not to negligently handle a loan
modification application).
266. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.1(a) (2010) (“A mortgage broker providing mortgage
brokerage services to a borrower is the fiduciary of the borrower . . . .”).
267. See, e.g., Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 37 (1916) (articulating that
common law provided an injured railroad employee with a cause of action against his
employer for negligence and a federal statute provided the duty of care for the negligence
claim because the plaintiff was within a class of people that the statute was intended to
benefit).
268. 49 Cal. 2d 647 (1958).
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based on application of its six-factor test.269 The six factors are (1) the
extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the
foreseeability of harm to him; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered; (5) the moral blame attached
to the defendant’s conduct; and (6) the policy of preventing future
harm.270
The common thread weaving through the fabric of the California
case law for determining whether a duty is present is whether the lender
has already accepted the borrower’s loan application.271 Once the lender
has accepted the application, a legally cognizable lender-borrower
relationship is established.272 Nymark v. Heart Federal Savings & Loan
Association273 held that the bank did not act as more than a mere lender
of money in part because the lender had not accepted the borrower’s loan
application at the time of the alleged negligent action.274 The borrower
had complained that the lender inaccurately appraised the borrower’s
collateral for the loan before accepting the borrower’s application, but the
appraisal occurred a step before accepting the loan.275
This pattern in case law on determining whether a duty is present
has continued in other states during the ongoing PPP litigation.276 For
example, Profiles v. Bank of America277 held that “the PPP ‘does not
269. See Nymark v. Heart Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1096,
1098 (1991) (specifying the general rule that “a financial institution owes no duty of care to
a borrower when the institution’s involvement in the loan transaction does not exceed the
scope of its conventional role as a mere lender of money,” and citing the six factors of
Biankanja).
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., id. (explaining that the lender had already approved the borrower’s loan
application and was sued for doing an incorrect appraisal); see also Alvarez v. BAC Loans
Servicing, LP, 228 Cal. App. 4th 941, 945-52 (2014) (holding that the lender had a duty to
not negligently handle the loan modification process, which requires the lender to have
approved the loan application in the first place).
272. Id.
273. 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089 (1991).
274. See, e.g., Nymark, at 1096–1097 (holding that the lender did not act as more than a
mere lender of money).
275. See, e.g., id. (describing the bank’s actions as using the appraisal to merely determine
whether the borrower’s collateral was adequate).
276. C.f., e.g., Profiles, Inc. v. Bank of America Corp., 453 F. Supp. 3d 742, 757 (D. Md.
Apr. 13, 2020) (holding that PPP lenders are not required to process loan applications on a
first come, first serve basis, presumably in part because there is no duty until the lender has
accepted the borrower’s loan application).
277. 453 F. Supp. 3d 742.
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constrain banks’ in ‘deciding from whom to accept applications, or in
what order to process applications [they] accept[].’”278 The defendant,
Bank of America, had not accepted the loan applications of the plaintiffs
that brought the negligence claims.279 Therefore, there is most likely no
common law duty for PPP lenders to process PPP loan applications on a
“first come, first served” basis because a lender’s duty does not trigger
until at least the acceptance of the borrower’s loan application.280 For
this reason, PPP lenders may deal first with their existing customers.
Once a plaintiff has established the duty element, the plaintiff
must satisfy the second element; that the defendant breached its duty and
that this breach proximately caused damages to the plaintiff. 281 A
defendant breaches his or her duty by acting in a manner that falls below
the standard of ordinary care in the management of the person or
property.282 When the defendant violates the standard of care established
by statute, California courts presume “negligence per se,” meaning that
the breach of duty element is satisfied.283 To determine whether the
lender’s breach of conduct proximately caused damages to the borrower,
California uses a “substantial factor” test.284 Determining whether the
lender’s breach was a substantial factor in causing damages to the
borrower is a question of fact typically resolved by a jury.285
278. Id. at 752–53.
279. See id. at 745 (explaining that plaintiffs were “unable to successfully apply for a PPP

loan”).
280. See id. (holding that PPP lenders are not required to process loan applications on a
first come, first serve basis, presumably in part because there is no duty until the lender has
accepted the borrower’s loan application).
281. Lueras v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, 221 Cal. App. 4th 49, 62 (2013).
282. Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a).
283. See Jacobs Farm/Del Cabo, Inc. v. Western Farm Serv., Inc., 190 Cal. App. 4th 1502,
1526 (2010) (“Although compliance with the law does not prove the absence of negligence,
violation of the law does raise a presumption that the violator was negligent. This is called
negligence per se.”); see also Taulbee v. EJ Distribution Corp., 35 Cal. App. 5th 590, 596
(2019) (“‘The negligence per se doctrine is codified in Evidence Code section 669,
subdivision (a), under which negligence is presumed if the plaintiff establishes four elements:
(1) the defendant violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation; (2) the violation proximately
caused death or injury to person or property; (3) the death or injury resulted from an
occurrence the nature of which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent;
and (4) the person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the
class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.’ ‘The
burden is on the proponent of a negligence per se instruction to demonstrate that these
elements are met.’”) (emphasis added).
284. Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 16 Cal. 4th 953, 968–969 (1997).
285. Raven H. v. Gamette, 157 Cal. App. 4th 1017, 1029–1030 (2007).
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Finally, the plaintiff must satisfy the third element, that there is a
compensable recovery that can be awarded to the plaintiff. 286 California
common law requires plaintiffs to support their claim for damages with
something more than speculation or conclusory allegations.287
Purporting to apply this case law, the plaintiffs in Karen’s Custom
Grooming contend that all three elements of negligence can be
satisfied.288 The denied applicants argue that the first element can be
satisfied because Wells Fargo owed a statutory duty under the CARES
Act to process the PPP loan applications with reasonable care on a “firstcome, first-served” basis.289 The borrowers also believe that Wells Fargo
owed a common law duty to reasonably implement the PPP and allow the
timely access and submission of their PPP applications online once Wells
Fargo undertook or agreed to review the borrower’s PPP applications.290
The applicants also argue that the second and third elements can
be satisfied.291 The applicants contend that Wells Fargo was negligent
per se when violating the standard of care established by the CARES
Act.292 To support that point, the applicants argue that Wells Fargo failed
to handle loan applications consistently with SBA regulations.293
Furthermore, the plaintiffs argue that this breach of duty caused damages
in the form of lost or reduced value of PPP loans that is compensable by
full award of damages allowed under law.294 Finally, the borrowers
purport to satisfy the third element by arguing that a trial can determine
the economic loss to the borrowers’ businesses. 295

286. Lueras, at 62.
287. E.g., Holly v. Alta Newport Hosp., Inc., 2020 WL 1853308, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10,

2020) (“[A] plaintiff must support her claim for [damages] with something more than [her]
own conclusory allegations, such as specific claims of genuine injury.”).
288. See Complaint at 51–53, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al.,
No. 20-cv-956, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020) (stating a claim of negligence
against Wells Fargo).
289. Complaint at 51, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., No.
20-cv-956, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 51–53.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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Defendant Wells Fargo has raised the defense in its response brief
that plaintiffs cannot satisfy the first two elements of negligence. 296
Wells Fargo argues that the plaintiffs cannot satisfy the first element
because California recognizes neither the purported statutory duty under
the CARES Act nor the common law duty.297 Additionally, Wells Fargo
argues that it owed no common law duty to the PPP applicants because
California common law does not impose a duty on lenders that have not
accepted the borrower’s loan application.298 For the second element,
Wells Fargo points out that the applicants failed to allege that the lender
caused any damage to the individual plaintiffs, instead relying on
aggregate SBA data to show injury caused by PPP lenders more
generally.299
Here, the likelihood of plaintiffs’ recovery under the theory of
negligence in Karen’s Custom Grooming is low because Wells Fargo’s
defenses regarding the first two elements will most likely succeed, and
the plaintiffs will not succeed in satisfying the third element because there
is no compensable recovery owed to them under law. For the first
element, which asks whether a duty exists, the CARES Act and SBA
regulations most likely do not impose a statutory duty on Wells Fargo to
review applications on a “first come, first served” basis.300 Indeed,
federal statutes can only impose a duty when there is an implied private
right of action, and the CARES Act does not provide plaintiffs with an
implied private right of action.301
Moreover, there is unlikely to be a common law duty for Wells
Fargo. Under California case law, there is no legally cognizable lenderborrower relationship between Wells Fargo and the denied applicants
because Wells Fargo has not accepted their loan applications and

296. Response Brief at 23, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al.,
No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. C.f. Profiles, Inc. v. Bank of America Corp., 453 F. Supp. 3d 742, 751–752 (D. Md.
Apr. 13, 2020) (holding that the CARES Act does not create a private right of action and
therefore private parties cannot bring lawsuits against banks for breach of the CARES Act).
301. See id. (holding that the CARES Act does not create a private right-of-action and
therefore private parties cannot bring lawsuits against banks for breach of the CARES Act).
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therefore has not engaged in a transaction with the plaintiffs.302 Because
no transaction has taken place, Wells Fargo is also right that California
does not recognize the common law duties to reasonably implement the
PPP or allow timely access to its PPP application on its website. 303 What
is more, Wells Fargo did not act more than a mere lender of money
because it never lent the money out to the plaintiffs in the first place.304
Like Nymark, where the bank’s appraisal of the borrower’s collateral was
a step before accepting the loan,305 Wells Fargo’s chosen order to process
PPP loan applications was merely a step before accepting PPP loans.306
The application of the six-factor Biankanja test will most likely
cut in favor of finding no common law duty. Arguably, the foreseeability
of harm to the applicants may be high because denial of PPP loans could
mean the denial of much needed capital to keep a business afloat during
the pandemic.307 However, there is still no duty. Indeed, no loan
transaction took place,308 and the degree of certainty that the borrower
suffered injury is low because the injury was partly self-imposed.309
Further, the closeness of the connection between Wells Fargo’s and the

302. Complaint at 51–53, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., No.
20-cv-956, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020) (suing Wells Fargo under the theory
of negligence for not accepting the plaintiffs’ PPP loan applications).
303. Response Brief at 23, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al.,
No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020).
304. Id.
305. See Nymark v. Heart Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1096–
1097 (1991) (describing the bank’s actions as using the appraisal to merely determine whether
the borrower’s collateral was adequate).
306. See Response Brief at 4, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al.,
No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020) (responding to
the plaintiffs’ complaint which stated that the plaintiffs were denied PPP loans).
307. See Shiloh Burgess, Small Businesses Need PPP Loan Forgiveness to Survive
pandemic,
WENATCHEE
VALLEY
BUS.
WORLD
(Aug.
1,
2020),
https://www.wenatcheeworld.com/wvbusiness/shiloh-burgess-small-businesses-need-ppploan-forgiveness-to-survive-pandemic/article_8d1dc68c-cd43-11ea-8590d70f2622252c.html [https://perma.cc/BVC7-6K6P] (describing how small businesses need
federal assistance to stay afloat during the pandemic).
308. Complaint at 51–53, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al., No.
20-cv-956, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020) (suing Wells Fargo under the theory
of negligence for not accepting the plaintiffs’ PPP loan applications).
309. See Profiles, Inc. v. Bank of America Corp., 453 F. Supp. 3d 742, 757 (D. Md. Apr.
13, 2020) (reasoning in a case based on similar facts that nothing stopped the alleged injured
plaintiffs from applying for PPP loans elsewhere after being denied by the defendant PPP
lender).
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applicant’s conduct is low because the plaintiffs only pleaded facts
regarding aggregate PPP lenders.310
Yet another reason for finding no common law duty for PPP
lenders is the holding of Profiles. The District Court in this case held that
there is no requirement for PPP lenders to process loan applications on a
“first come, first served” basis.311 Although Profiles is a decision from
Maryland, it is consistent with California’s Nymark decision because both
cases find no duty for a lender based on facts in which the lender has not
accepted the borrower’s loan application.312 Therefore, plaintiffs cannot
satisfy the first element of their negligence claim.
Plaintiffs most likely cannot satisfy the second element as well
because Wells Fargo most likely did not violate SBA regulations. A court
may consider that the SBA regulation requiring PPP loan applications to
be reviewed on a “first come, first served” basis is only applicable to the
SBA.313 Contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument, Wells Fargo is most likely
not negligent per se for violating a statute or regulation. Moreover,
whether plaintiffs can satisfy proximate causation turns on questions of
fact that a jury would need to resolve.314 Therefore, showing proximate
causation depends on whether a trier of fact believes that Wells Fargo’s
denial of PPP loan applications proximately caused economic harm to the
plaintiffs.315
Finally, the plaintiffs cannot satisfy the third element, which
requires a showing that there is a compensable recovery that can be
awarded to the plaintiff under law.316 Here, plaintiffs cannot support their
claim for damages merely with speculation and conclusory allegations by
relying on aggregate SBA data on PPP lenders.317 Accordingly, Wells
Fargo will most likely not be held liable on the theory of negligence.
310. Response Brief at 23, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al.,
No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020).
311. See Profiles, at 757 (holding that there is no duty for the PPP lender to process the
applications on a first come, first serve basis).
312. See Nymark v. Heart Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1096–
1097 (1991) (holding that there is no duty for the lender that conducted of an appraisal of a
borrower’s collateral before accepting the loan application).
313. Response Brief at 12, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al.,
No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020).
314. Raven H. v. Gamette, 157 Cal. App. 4th 1017, 1029–1030 (2007).
315. Id.
316. Lueras v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, 221 Cal. App. 4th 49, 62 (2013).
317. Response Brief at 23, Karen’s Custom Grooming LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co. et al.,
No. 20-cv-956, complaint filed, 2020 WL 2754919 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2020).
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For the foregoing reasons, PPP lenders will most likely not be
found liable to applicants on claims of intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage and negligence. But the door for
potential lender liability does not shut once the claims brought by denied
PPP applicants fail. In fact, another set of claims brought against banks—
claims brought by agents—pose potential for lender liability. However,
based on the applicable case law, the plaintiffs’ likelihood of recovery on
those claims are similarly low.318
C.

Limited Likelihood of Lender Liability to Agents of Borrowers

Agents believe that they are entitled to a portion of a lender’s fees
for helping applicants with their PPP application.319 Agents assert this
claim although most, if not all, agents in the country do not have an
agreement with lenders to that effect.320 In support of this argument,
agents cite to a SBA regulation, stating that “[a]gent fees will be paid by
the lender out of the fees the lender receives from SBA . . . [t]he total
amount that an agent may collect from the lender for assistance in
preparing an application for a PPP loan (including referral to the lender)
may not exceed” limits established by the Administrator.321 Accordingly,
agents read this language of the regulation to mean that they are entitled
to a portion of a lender’s fees under the PPP.322
Recognizing that a court is unlikely to grant a private right of
action under the CARES Act, agents seek compensation under common

318. See infra Part IV.C.
319. See Juan Antonio Sanchez, PC v. Bank of South Tex., 2020 WL 6060868 (S.D. Tex.

Oct. 14, 2020) (describing an example of a lawsuit where the borrower alleges that the bank
owed the agent finder’s fees).
320. See Dorothy Atkins, Big Banks Beat Suit Over Unpaid PPP Loan Fees for Now,
LAW360 (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1329380/big-banks-beat-suitover-unpaid-ppp-loan-fees-for-now, [https://perma.cc/X2AG-YNFA] (describing how a
recent putative class action lawsuit against banks brought by agents alleging negligence for
failure of banks to pay agent fees is part of lawsuits around the country that are being
dismissed in part because there is no contract between the banks and agents).
321. Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed.
Reg. 20811, 20816 (Apr. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 120),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/PPP%20Interim%20Final%20Rule_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X458-EPXB].
322. See, e.g., Juan Antonio Sanchez, PC, 2020 WL 6060868 at *11 (describing an
argument of agents believing they are entitled to agent fees under the language of SBA
regulations).
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law theories of recovery. 323 As of October 2020, agents have brought
over fifty lawsuits around the country regarding the failure of lenders to
pay agent fees.324 Agents most frequently use the theory of unjust
enrichment in their quest for recovery. 325
The agents will most likely lose on all of their common law
claims. The Relief Act has codified the recent case law that provides
lenders with a bright-line rule finding no lender liability when applied.326
More specifically, the Relief Act expressly agrees with the new cases that
joined “the emerging consensus,” holding that “agents who assist
applicants with a PPP [application] are not entitled to agent fees in the
absence of an agreement with the lenders.”327 In a recent case, Juan
Antonio Sanchez, PC v. Bank of South Texas328 reached this holding on
theories of unjust enrichment and conversion by highlighting a common,
flawed premise underlying the agent’s arguments—that the SBA
regulation entitles agents to a portion of a lender’s fees. 329 The agent did
not complete a compensation agreement, also known as Form 159,330
required for agents to be paid, a requirement that was in place before the
PPP and has remained in effect.331 In an attempt to justify noncompliance
with this requirement, the agent unsuccessfully argued that the CARES
Act and applicable SBA regulations supersedes this previous
323. See, e.g., Complaint at 16, A.D. Sims, LLC v. Wintrust Financial Corp., No. 1:20-cv02644 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2020) (alleging common law claim of unjust enrichment).
324. See Margaret Cupples and Elizabeth Boone, CARES Act Doesn’t Entitle Accountants
to Fees for Helping Borrowers Get PPP Loans, BRADLEY (Oct. 29, 2020),
https://www.classactiondeclassified.com/2020/10/cares-act-doesnt-entitle-accountants-tofees-for-helping-borrowers-get-ppp-loans/ [https://perma.cc/C976-AE5C] (explaining how
there are fifty current lawsuits pending throughout the country regarding lawsuits on banks’
failure to pay PPP agent fees).
325. See, e.g., Complaint at 16, A.D. Sims, LLC v. Wintrust Financial Corp., No. 1:20-cv02644 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2020) (alleging common law claim of unjust enrichment); see also
Juan Antonio Sanchez, PC, 2020 WL 6060868 (holding that the agent did not state a valid
unjust enrichment claim against the PPP lender).
326. Economic Aid to Hard-Hit Small Businesses, Nonprofits, and Venues Act, H.R. 133,
116th Cong. § 340 (2020).
327. Id.
328. 2020 WL 6060868 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2020).
329. See id. at *10 (“Largely because the PPP does not entitle plaintiffs to any portion of
the lenders’ fees (absent an agreement), each of these state law claims fails and must be
dismissed.”).
330. See id. at *9 (“Form 159 nevertheless unambiguously provides that it must be
completed when an agent is to be paid.”).
331. See 15 U.S.C. § 642 (2018) (requiring agents and lenders to agree to compensation of
the agent by signing Form 159).
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requirement. 332 Juan Antonio Sanchez held that the CARES Act and PPP
did not alter the previous requirement to use a compensation agreement
for agents to be paid.333
The Relief Act provides a bright-line rule to lenders that a written
compensation agreement must be established before any payment of
agent fees relating to the PPP is made.334 More importantly, this
procedure must be used for an agent to survive a lender’s motion to
dismiss on any common law claim.335 Accordingly, Congress has made
clear what courts already knew—PPP lenders have limited lender liability
to agents of PPP applicants.
V. CONCLUSION
In short, there is limited lender liability for PPP lenders.336 First,
courts are unlikely to certify PPP applicants or their agents in class action
lawsuits, thus reducing the higher likelihood of recovery that plaintiffs
typically enjoy in class action lawsuits.337 Second, plaintiffs have a low
likelihood of recovery on the most frequent ongoing common law claims
of intentional interference with economic advantage and negligence
brought by PPP applicants.338 Third, plaintiffs have a low likelihood of
recovery on agents’ common law claim of unjust enrichment.339
Limited lender liability for PPP lenders is illustrative of the
government’s success in implementing the PPP.340 When PPP lenders
are aware that there is less risk of lender liability in programs such as the
332. See Juan Antonio Sanchez, PC, 2020 WL 6060868 at *7 (dismissing plaintiffs’
argument that the PPP supersedes the previous requirement that agents do not need to
complete Form 159 to be paid).
333. Id. at *9.
334. Economic Aid to Hard-Hit Small Businesses, Nonprofits, and Venues Act, H.R. 133,
116th Cong. § 340 (2020).
335. See id. (dismissing agents’ common law claims of unjust enrichment and conversion
for failure to fill out Form 159).
336. See supra Part IV.
337. See supra Part IV.A.
338. See supra Part IV.B.
339. See supra Part IV.C.
340. C.f., John Detrixhe & Dan Kopf, The PPP Was Actually a Big Success Argues an
Obama-era Ofﬁcial, QUARTZ (July 16, 2020), https://qz.com/1878677/paycheck-protectionloans-had-no-job-retention-requirements/ [https://perma.cc/6UFC-GNTX] (interviewing a
Harvard Business School Fellow Karen Mills, who lead the Small Business Administration
during the Obama administration and said that although there were flaws and “bad actors” in
the PPP, the program “helped literally millions of small businesses survive”).
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PPP, they are more likely to participate. 341 That participation supports
the success of governmental intervention during financial crises. 342
Indeed, the participation of lenders in the PPP is generally seen as
successful to help small businesses survive a once-in-a-century global
health crisis.343
Successfully implementing the PPP required a vast governmental
power that the federal government has honed in over the course of U.S.
history.344 That vast governmental power developed first with the
creation of the Federal Reserve Board in 1913 to lend money to banks.345
Subsequently, the FDIC was created to establish a strong federal safety
net that protects customer’s deposits at banks.346 Then, the Great
Recession of 2008 refined the FRB’s and FDIC’s authority to intervene
during financial crises.347 More specifically, the Dodd-Frank Act now
requires federal assistance programs to use volunteer lenders and general
requirements for lenders to participate. 348 Those statutory requirements
help explain the PPP, a program that requires PPP lenders to volunteer
and meet the general requirements to participate. 349

341. See Vivian Merker, Tammi Ling, Daniel Tannebaum, PPP is a Compliance Minefield
for
Banks,
AM.
BANKER
(May
6,
2020,
9:54
AM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/ppp-is-a-compliance-minefield-for-banks
[https://perma.cc/4NXM-ZBPT] (describing how some banks were hesitant at first to
participate in the PPP, implying that banks would be less anxious if there was a lower risk of
lender liability).
342. See Press Release from Maxine Waters, supra note 30 (explaining that the PPP would
not be successful without the participation of banks).
343. See Neil Amato, A Product Pivot and PPP Success in the Early Days of the Pandemic,
J.
OF
ACCOUNTANCY
(July
13,
2020),
https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2020/jul/sons-liberty-coronavirus-productpivot-ppp-success.html [https://perma.cc/V8LL-NFTL] (providing an argument of why the
PPP and the participation of banks in that program is widely successful).
344. See supra Part II.A.
345. FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 68.
346. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) (2018) (changing the “standard maximum deposit
insurance amount” from $100,000 to $250,000, making permanent a change the FDIC
exercised using its emergency powers during the 2008 Financial Crisis); see also US DEP’T
OF STATE, supra note 66 (explaining that the creation of deposit insurance for banks,
implemented by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, is one of the most important
regulations that exist in the U.S. banking system).
347. TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, supra note 76.
348. 12 U.S.C. § 53 (2018).
349. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) § 1102, 15
U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(F)(ii) (West 2021) (providing the generally applicable requirements
that banks participating in PPP must implement).
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Despite the successes of the PPP and the limited lender liability
for PPP lenders, banks participating in the PPP have one notable
drawback.350 Banks face servicing liability due to the higher costs
associated with keeping PPP loan portfolios on their balance sheet. 351
More specifically, larger banks anticipate higher servicing liability for
PPP loans because they have to navigate a more complex loan
forgiveness process.352 Indeed, Congress’s latest round of PPP funding
only provides a streamlined loan forgiveness process for loans of less
than $150,000,353 a loan size that is mostly held on the balance sheets of
smaller banks.354
Ultimately, only the largest PPP lenders face servicing liability,
and more generally, PPP lenders face limited lender liability.355 While
lenders participating in emergency loan programs like the PPP will never
be able to completely eliminate their servicing liability, nor their liability
at common law, lenders can at least understand their liability risk
exposure. 356 No good deed goes unpunished, but the lender liability for
PPP lenders is limited, which will help lenders focus on the right thing
during the current financial crisis—helping the economy recover. 357
ADHITYA MAHESH

350. See supra Part II.B.
351. See supra Parts III–IV.
352. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 (“Relief Act”), Pub. L. No. 116–260,

134 Stat. 1182, 1993 (requiring simply a 1-page loan forgiveness application for loans of
$150,000 or less but a more complicated loan forgiveness application for loans of more than
$150,000).
353. Id.
354. See 2020 Paycheck Protection Program Rep, supra note 164 (providing aggregate data
on PPP lenders through August 8, 2020 where the top 15 PPP lenders provided an average
loan size close to or above $150,000, with a few exceptions such as Wells Fargo).
355. See supra Part IV.
356. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special? A Revisitation, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
MINNEAPOLIS (Mar. 1, 2000), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2000/are-banks-special
(explains the importance of banks in the economy and breaks down the structure of banks).
357. See id. (explains the importance of banks in the economy and breaks down the
structure of banks).
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